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Introduction
U.S policymakers increasingly focus their attention on the challenge of health
care quality. The intersection of health care quality and public policy is not new, but
the desire to find more effective and prospective interventions against substandard care
is much more pronounced than a generation ago. For centuries, the legal system has
employed a measurement system known as the “professional standard of care” to
determine legal liability for medical negligence and this standard has become more
rigorous over the past several decades.1 Furthermore, tools such as professional
education and training, as well as licensure and accreditation, are longstanding in U.S.
policy.
But the rapid escalation in health costs that began in the early 1970s,
accompanied by documented and inexplicable variations in health care quality as well
as a movement toward greater openness in the relationship between patients and
physicians, has led researchers into an increasingly critical examination of health care
quality and toward the development of evidence-based measures for assessing quality.2
These measures, which are then used to examine distinct sub-populations, payer
systems, and diagnostic conditions, extend beyond an intellectual interest in health care
quality. Payers have exhibited a marked interest in using these population-based
measures to gauge the value and quality of the services they purchase.3 This interest in
turn has spurred quality improvement activities sponsored by the managed care
industry, national accreditation organizations, and professional societies.4 Reporting
systems now permit health care consumers to compare health systems on a variety of
measures and indicators,5 and a number of studies and reports focus specifically on the
quality of pediatric care.6
1

Rosenbaum, S. (March 26, 2003). The Impact of United States Law on Medicine As a Profession. JAMA
289(12), http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/289/12/1546.pdf.
2
See Adams, K. and Corrigan, JM., Eds. (2003). Committee on Identifying Priority Areas for Quality
Improvement, Priority Areas for National Action: Transforming Health Care Quality. Washington, DC:
National Academy Press; Institute of Medicine (1999). To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System.
Washington, DC: IOM, http://www.iom.edu/includes/dbfile.asp?id=4117; Institute of Medicine (2000).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century. Washington, DC: IOM,
http://www.iom.edu/includes/dbfile.asp?id=4124.
3
See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, http://www.cms.gov; For a collection of materials and
tools on purchasing quality health care, see http://www.facct.org/facct/site; for a sample of Leapfrog’s
performance expectations, see http://www.leapfroggroup.org/toolkit/GMPatientSafetyPerf.pdf; See also
Partridge, L. (2001). The APHSA Medicaid HEDIS Database Project: Report for the Third Project Year (Data
for 1999), Washington, DC: The Commonwealth Fund, December,
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/quality/partridge_aphsa_hedis_1999.pdf (or Partridge, L. and Ingalls
Szlyuk, C. (February, 2000). National Medicaid HEDIS Database/Benchmark Project. Washington, DC:
The Commonwealth Fund, http://www.cmwf.org/programs/quality/partridge_hedis_366.asp.
4
For information about NCQA’s Quality Compass, see
http://www.ncqa.org/Info/QualityCompass/index.htm;
For information about JCAHO’s program in Performance Measurement in Health Care, see
http://www.jcaho.org/pms/index.htm; See also, Leatherman, S. and McCarthy, D. (April, 2002). Quality
of Health Care in the United States: A Chartbook. Washington, DC: The Commonwealth Fund,
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/pub_highlight.asp?id=736&pubid=520&CategoryID=3.
5
See NCQA’s Health Choices at http://www.healthchoices.org/.
6
March, A. (April, 2003). The Business Case for Clinical Pathways and Outcomes Management: A Case
Study of Children’s Hospital and Health Center of San Diego. Washington, DC: The Commonwealth Fund,
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/quality/march_physicianorderentry_609.pdf; Bethell, C. et al.
(September, 2002) Partnering with Parents to Promote the Healthy Development of Young Children
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Quality improvement activities extend beyond the realm of informal activities by
purchasers and health systems. Error reduction legislation designed to prospectively
improve performance while shielding the medical care industry against excessive liability
for negligence, has been enacted at the state level of government.7 Purchasers also
have sought legally enforceable contractual approaches to quality that permit a level of
legal accountability for health care quality that simply did not exist outside of the tort
system a generation ago.
This study, undertaken for the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, examines
the structure and operation of Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP) health care access and quality monitoring systems for children enrolled in
comprehensive managed care arrangements. As the single largest purchasers of
pediatric health care in the U.S., Medicaid and SCHIP agencies play a potentially
powerful role in pediatric health policy. How these agencies approach, design, and
carry out health quality monitoring activities has the potential to have a major impact
not only for poor and low-income children, but for the entire pediatric health system.
Even when these systems are developed exclusively for publicly insured children, their
influence can extend beyond the “four corners” of a specific contractual arrangement,
since participating health professionals, health care institutions and businesses typically
are not exclusive to these arrangements, and the devolutionary influence of one
purchaser’s expectations thus can travel beyond the scope of the agreement.
This analysis opens with an overview of enforcement of health care access and
quality standards at both the individual and purchaser level, providing both a brief
overview of the safeguards and protections available to individual children and families,
as well as applicable federal standards concerning agency enforcement action. It then
turns to the question of structure: what types of tools do public agencies maintain to
assess—and more importantly enforce—expectations of health care quality? Finally, it
reports on the experiences of state agencies with the enforcement of standards. The
study concludes with a discussion of relevant policy implications.

The Medicaid and SCHIP Health Quality Enforcement Framework:
A Multi-Based Rationale for Focusing on Pediatric Health Quality
For a number of reasons, the quality of care for low-income children insured
through public insurance programs is of particular concern. First, lower-income
Enrolled in Medicaid. Washington, DC: The Commonwealth Fund,
http://www.cmwf.org/publist/publist2.asp?CategoryID=2.
7
Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (Reported in House)[H.R.663.RH]; Flowers, L. (February,
2002). State Responses to the Problem of Medical Errors: An Analysis of Recent State Legislative Proposals.
Washington, DC: National Academy for State Health Policy,
http://www.nashp.org/_docdisp_page.cfm?LID=05607042-4CAC-11D6-BCEE00A0CC558925; Rosenthal, J.
and Booth, M. (March, 2003). Defining Reportable Adverse Events: A Guide for States Tracking Medical
Error. Washington, DC: National Academy for State Health Policy.
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children are at elevated risk for a wide range of physical, developmental, and mental
health conditions and disorders. This is true even in the case of children who enter
public insurance through eligibility pathways other than disability (i.e., children whose
connection to Medicaid and SCHIP is based on income alone).8 As Figure 1 shows,
conditions requiring additional monitoring and preventive interventions are generally
prevalent among lower income children.
Figure 1. Four States’ Top Ten Diagnoses of Chronic or Disabling Conditions
among Child Medicaid Beneficiaries

Diagnosis
Asthma
Attention Deficit Disorder
Congenital Anomalies (e.g., cleft palate, Downs
Syndrome)
Chronic Depression
Intestinal Infectious Diseases (e.g., giardia)
Osteopathies, Chondropathies, and Acquired
Musculoskeletal Deformities (e.g., acquired
deformities of limbs, osteomyelitis)
Burns
Other Disorders of the Central Nervous System
(e.g., multiple sclerosis, epilepsy)
Psychoses (e.g., schizophrenia, affective
psychosis)
Neurotic Disorders (e.g., obsessive-compulsive
disorders, agoraphobia)
Other Diseases of the Respiratory System (e.g.,
tracheostomy complication, abscess of lung)
Hernia of Abdominal Cavity

Number of states (of 4) in which
this Condition is a “Top Ten”
Diagnosis for Child Medicaid
beneficiaries
4
4
4

Source: Brodsky et al., 2003

4
4
4
4
4
2
2
1
1
9

A second reason for focusing on pediatric health policy relates to both the
dominance of children in public insurance and the intermittent nature of their coverage,
which triggers a need to maximize health quality during periods of coverage. Children
comprise some 50 percent of all Medicaid beneficiaries and nearly all SCHIP enrollees.
The quality of pediatric care thus would be expected to be a dominant theme in health
quality measurement.
Children’s eligibility patterns further propel the need for
monitoring the quality of pediatric care. Studies suggest that periods of Medicaid and
SCHIP eligibility for a significant portion of enrollees may be, on average, no longer
than 11 to 12 months, and children enrolled in Medicaid and SCHIP incur long periods
8

Brodsky, K.L., Cuccia, L., Kelleher, A. et al (Eds) (March, 2003). The Faces of Medicaid: The Complexities
of Caring for People with Chronic Illnesses and Disabilities. Washington DC: The Center for Health Care
Strategies, http://www.chcs.org/publications/cfm-view.html.
9
Ibid.
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without any coverage.10 The intermittent nature of children’s insurance coverage
promotes a sense that health care should be optimized during periods of enrollment.11
To that end, the managed care arrangements in which Medicaid and SCHIP agencies
enroll most children may offer especially important protections, since the obligation of
managed care contractors is not merely to cover necessary services that fall within the
contract but to actually make care available.12
A third rationale for the high interest in pediatric health quality is that the actual
receipt of care, not mere coverage, is a distinct goal of U.S. pediatric health policy.
Health promotion, along with early intervention to avert disability, represent major
objectives of both Medicaid (as embodied in its special benefit known as “Early and
Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment” services (EPSDT)13 and SCHIP.14
Furthermore, the concern over health quality extends beyond the programmatic
boundaries of Medicaid and SCHIP themselves. Other important children’s programs
such as HeadStart, the Supplemental Feeding Program for Women, Infants and Children
(WIC), child welfare programs, and basic and special education programs all depend to
at least some degree on access to health care among low-income children as part of
their ability to achieve their own objectives. For example, assuring access to preventive
health services is a basic function of HeadStart programs; similarly, inclusion of
necessary medical care is a specific aspect of the individualized education plans written
for children who participate in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).
Yet neither HeadStart nor the IDEA maintains health funds of its own; each depends
instead on Medicaid and SCHIP to finance health care. Indeed, the IDEA specifically
references Medicaid. Medicaid, in turn, contains statutory references to the IDEA, WIC,
and other programs serving children.
Finally, health quality has evolved as a focus of large health insurance
purchasers in conjunction with the evolution of the entire insurance system. Twenty
years ago, Medicaid agencies, like private insurers, paid bills as Medicaid participating
providers interacted with their patients. Undeniably, Medicaid agencies historically have
had a statutory obligation to focus on pediatric access under EPSDT, as well as a duty
to focus on provider selection and health quality.15 But fundamentally, Medicaid
10

Dick, A., Allison, A., Haber, S. et al. (Spring 2002)Consequences of States’ Policies for SCHIP
Disenrollment. Health Care Financing Review 23(3): 65-88; Allison, A., Andrew, A., Shenkman, E. (June
27, 2003) Pathways Through SCHIP: A Longitudinal Analysis of Enrollment and Coverage Patterns.
Presentation at 20th Annual Research Meeting of AcademyHealth, Nashville, TN; Austein Casnoff, C. (June
26, 2003) The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)—
Five Years of Progress. Presentation at Fifth Annual Child Health Services Research Meeting: What Works
in Child Health Services Research, Nashville, TN.
11
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (Mary 31, 2002). Children’s Health—Why Health
Insurance Matters. Fact Sheet, Washington, DC: KFF, http://www.kff.org/content/2002/4055/4055.pdf.
12
Rosenbaum, S. (February 19, 2003). Managed Care and Patients Rights (Editorial) Journal of the
American Medical Association 289 (7): 906-907, http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/289/7/906.
13
Rosenbaum, S. and Sonosky, C. (December, 2000) Federal EPSDT Coverage Policy: An Analysis of State
Medicaid Plans and State Medicaid Managed Care Contracts.
http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/medicaid_publications_epsdt.htm
14
Rosenbaum, S., and Sonosky, C. (2001) Medicaid Reforms and SCHIP: Health Care Coverage and the
Changing Policy Environment in DeVita, C., and Mosher-Williams, R., Eds. Who Speaks for America’s
Children: The Role of Child Advocates in Public Policy. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.
15
§1902(a)(8) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(8); §1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(30)(A); §1902(a)(43) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(43); 42
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agencies functioned similarly to private indemnity arrangements in their relatively distant
relationship with actual provider performance.
Provider participation contracts
contained no performance measures or treatment duties but instead were limited to the
business elements of the relationship (e.g., payment terms, licensure and accreditation
status, and term and termination). Today Medicaid and SCHIP agencies, like private
purchasers, purchase “hybrid” health coverage arrangements that specifically and
contractually merge coverage and care. As the United States Supreme Court has
observed, these arrangements “wear two hats” and obligate contractors not only to the
management of insurance resources but also to the management of health care itself.16
This fundamental shift in the nature of insurance coverage compels purchasers to
extend their focus beyond simple claims payment and into the realm of access and
quality. Figure 2 shows the numerous “domains” covered by these contracts; 17 together,
these domains reflect the underlying dimensions of classic quality assessment: structure,
process of care, health care outcomes, and consumer interaction with the health system.
Figure 2. Managed Care Contracting Domains
Key Domains
Enrollment
Coverage and Benefits
Service Duties
Public Health and Social Service
Relationships
Quality Assurance, Data, and Reporting
Business Terms and Relationships
Payment

Agency

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System, www.gwhealthpolicy.org

C.F.R. §441.56; §1915(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396n(b); §1932(b)(5) and §1932(c) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396u-2(b)(5) and (c); §42 C.F.R. 431.55
16
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211.
17
See Rosenbaum, S. et al., Negotiating the New Health System: A Nationwide Study of Medicaid
Managed Care Contracts, 1st-4th editions (1997-2001), Washington, DC: GWU-CHSRP,
http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/managed_care.htm.
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Part I:
A.

Pathways to Accountability

Individual Enforcement of Health Care Access and Quality Standards

In some cases, federal and state laws offer children and their families means for
enforcing the legal obligations undertaken by managed care contractors on their behalf.
But as important as they are, individual legal enforcement tools are quite constrained,
inaccessible, and not particularly effective in structuring systemic improvements in
quality. These limitations grow out of the nature of law and legal enforcement, the
difficulties in securing legal representation, and practical considerations in litigation.
Table 1 sets out a taxonomy of individual legal enforcement mechanisms, as well
as their application and limitations. As Table 1 shows, in the context of this study,
individual enforcement can be categorized into four major categories: a) health care
quality litigation involving medical liability; b) litigation to enforce federal rights; c)
litigation to enforce state law rights, particularly rights created by the large purchasing
agreements; and d) grievances and appeals. Each tool has distinct applications and
limitations.
Table 1. Individual Enforcement Mechanisms: Legal Basis, Application, and
Limitations
MECHANISM
a) Malpractice litigation

b) Enforcement of
federal legal rights

c) Enforcement of

6

LEGAL BASIS
State law (common
law and statutory
rights)

Federal statutes

State constitutions,

APPLICATION

LIMITATIONS

Against individual
health professionals

Complex elements of
proof

Against health care
corporations
including managed
care organizations for
both corporate and
vicarious liability

Limited availability in
the case of low-income
children

Can be used in those
cases in which federal
law is determined to
create both
enforceable
individual
expectations among
persons served by a
program and the legal
right to bring an
individual
enforcement action

Can be used to

Available only after
serious injury has
occurred
The narrow nature of
what courts will
recognize as a “legal”
right
The imminence of the
injury that must be
present
The complexity of
systemic class-wide
litigation and the
difficulty of fashioning
and monitoring
workable legal remedies,
particularly where the
legal issues are access
and quality
3 states specifically

MECHANISM
contractual rights
created by managed
care state contracts

d) Grievances, appeals,
and fair hearings

LEGAL BASIS
statutes, and
regulations; state
“common law”

Federal law, state
contracts, state rules
and statutes

APPLICATION
enforce qualityrelated rights that are
created by contracts
between state
agencies and
managed care
organizations.

Individual cases
where care has been
or may be denied

LIMITATIONS
preclude third party
enforcement actions by
Medicaid and SCHIP
enrollees
Injury must be actual or
imminent
Size and complexity of
actions; suits typically
limited to named
individuals only;
remedies difficult to
devise and monitor
Single claims and nonsystemic in nature.
Injuries must be actual or
imminent

Source: GW CHSRP, 2003.

a.

Medical malpractice litigation

Medical malpractice cases can be brought not only against health professionals
but against health care corporations,18 including litigation against managed care
organizations for both vicarious19 and corporate20 liability. But bringing malpractice
actions is difficult, costly, and time consuming and the number of cases is very small in
relation to the total number of possible negligence events.21 Poor children may be at
particular risk of under-representation, because of financial disincentives in their
representation. Unless there exists the type of negligent conduct that would be
considered egregious under state law and thus would qualify for noneconomic
damages (e.g., willful or wanton disregard for human life), pediatric cases are worth little
other than the families’ out-of-pocket medical care costs because in the case of
children, lost earnings would not be an issue.
b.

Federal rights enforcement

Medicaid (and SCHIP when it is administered as part of the Medicaid plan)
creates certain federal legal rights in children. Federal law establishes certain legal rights
to coverage and benefits, and children have the right to seek recourse in court when
these rights are allegedly violated.22 But these rights are narrow; indeed, many of the
18

Rosenblatt, R.., Rosenbaum, S., and Frankford, D. (1997, 2002-2002 Supp) Law and the American
Health Care System, Chapter 3, New York, NY: Foundation Press.
19
Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 547 A2nd 1229 (Pa. Super 1988); Shannon v. McNulty 718 A2nd
828 (Pa. Super. 1988); and Petrovitch v. Share Health Plan 719 NE 2nd 756.
20
Moscovitch v. Danbury Hospital 25 F. Supp 2d 74 (D.Ct. 1998); In re US Healthcare; Lazorka v. Penn
Hospital 237 F3d 242 (3rd Circuit, 2000).
21
See, e.g., Roan Gresenz, C., Hensler, D, Studdert, D. et al. (1999) A Flood of Litigation? Predicting the
Consequences of Changing Legal Remedies Available to ERISA Beneficiaries. Health RAND Law Issue
Paper, http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP184/
22
42 U.S.C. §1983.
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most important general legal duties of states and their contractors under managed care
may not create individually enforceable rights at all but may instead be capable of
enforcement only by the Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
c.

Third party beneficiary enforcement

Traditionally, state courts have recognized a “common law” (i.e., judicially
created) right on the part of insured persons to enforce the terms of their contracts.23
This right is known as “third party beneficiary enforcement,” and is embodied for the
most part in modern state insurance laws, as well as federal laws related to insurance
and health plans.
Third party enforcement does not appear to apply to Medicaid and SCHIP,
however. Evidence from other studies suggests that these contracts may be exempt from
state insurance laws either entirely or in part with a separate and legally distinct body of
Our own review of state Medicaid and SCHIP contracts suggests
regulation.24
considerable ambiguity regarding the application of state insurance law. Indeed, of the
contracts we analyzed,25 only five contain provisions relating to third party beneficiary
enforcement; of these, two (Minnesota and North Carolina) contain language expressly
declaring that Medicaid beneficiaries are intended third party beneficiaries to the
contract between the state and the managed care organization; the remaining three
direct that beneficiaries are not to be considered third party beneficiaries.26 No similar
provisions were found in the separate SCHIP managed care contracts.
State Medicaid and SCHIP agencies could give beneficiaries the right to enforce
at least certain contractual terms directly through third party beneficiary actions but few
do so. Although a state agency has the legal power to broadly define a range of
contractual injuries that are capable of legal enforcement by enrollees, practical and
market considerations obviously preclude this. What company would be willing to do
business with a state agency that made it easy for enrollees to sue the contractor for
general complaints about health care quality?
With respect to all forms of judicial remedies, it is important to note that the very
power of both state and federal courts causes them (and legislatures) to be strict about
who can gain access to judicial relief and under what circumstances. To the layperson,
it may appear that there is a deluge of cases. But in fact, very few claims of legal injury
are ever litigated in court because of strict jurisprudential rules related to who can bring
cases and under what circumstances, as well as numerous federal and state laws that
not only make the process of litigation difficult but also curb the size of recoveries.27
23

See Calamari and Perillo, Contracts 3rd Ed. 1987, §§17-4, 17-7.
See, e.g., Kaye, N. (June 2001) Medicaid Managed Care: A Guide for States, 5th Edition Portland, ME:
National Academy of State Health Policy; Perkins, J, Hitov, S. (September 2003) Enforcing the Bargain:
An Overview of Third Party Beneficiary Claims in Medicaid Cases.
http://www.healthlaw.org/pubs/200310.issuebrief.htm
25
A total of 50 Medicaid managed care contracts and 15 separate SCHIP contracts were reviewed.
26
No contract included a third party beneficiary provision in specifications concerning an enrollee’s
rights and responsibilities. Rhode Island is the only state that defines the term “party,” making clear that
the state and the MCO are the only contracting parties to the contractual agreement. Negotiating the New
Health System, 2001.
27
Moscovitch v. Danbury Hospital 25 F. Supp 2d 74 (D.Ct. 1998); In re US Healthcare; Lazorka v. Penn
Hospital 237 F3d 242 (3rd Circuit, 2000).
24
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Most fundamentally perhaps, courts insist on real individual injury before they intervene
(known as the law of “standing”), as opposed to generalized complaints about how a
system is working. This means that even if a remedy is available, a legal representative
can be found, and the process is accessible, children cannot use their individual
enforcement tools unless they have been injured or face an imminent risk of injury.
d.

Individual enforcement through administrative complaints

Federal law accords Medicaid and SCHIP enrolled children the right to appeal
managed care denials and delays in coverage and care and guarantees the right to an
external and impartial review of claims. Figure 3 summarizes the key elements of
federal law related to Medicaid and SCHIP external grievances and appeals.
But a
grievance and appeal also involves injuries that either have occurred or that are
imminent. Furthermore, appeals are by their nature individualized, non-precedential,
and thus not a means of making systemic change. Studies of grievance and appeals
systems suggest that they are seldom used in relation to the incidence of injury.28 Thus,
as important as the legal right to appeal and external review may be, it is not a substitute
for systemic monitoring and enforcement.
Figure 3. Key Elements of Medicaid and SCHIP External Grievances and Appeals
KEY ELEMENTS

MEDICAID

SCHIP

General
requirement

•

States must provide for an
opportunity for a “fair hearing”
process when benefits are denied
and follow specific time frames for
hearing decisions. They may allow
enrollees direct access to a fair
hearing (i.e., enrollees do not need
to exhaust an MCO’s internal
grievances and appeals system
before they appeal to the state).
They must ensure that their hearing
system meets the minimum,
federally-specified requirements
(see below).

•

Core elements of
the process

•

The hearing system must allow for
either a hearing before the state
agency or an evidentiary hearing at
the local level with a right to
appeal to the state level. The
hearing system must follow due

•

28

States must provide an opportunity
for an independent, external review
process when benefits are denied
and set specific time frames for the
review. They have flexibility in how
they design the process: they can
either meet the minimum
requirements set in federal
regulations (see below) or, if a state’s
consumer protection law meets or
exceeds these requirements, they can
rely on state law and choose to
require providers to comply with
state-specific grievance and appeals
requirements currently in effect for
health insurers in the state. States
may elect to use the Medicaid “fair
hearing” process.
Reviews must be conducted by an
impartial person or entity, review
decisions must be timely and
written, and enrollees must have an
opportunity to represent themselves
or use a representative of their

See, e.g., Pollitz, K., Crowley, J., Lucia, K., Bangit, E. (May 2002) Assessing State External Review
Programs
and the Effects of Pending Federal Patients' Rights Legislation, Washington, DC: Kaiser Family
Foundation, http://www.kff.org/content/2002/3221/externalreviewpart2rev.pdf; Studdert, D., Roan
Gresenz, C. (February 19, 2003) Enrollee Appeals of Preservice Coverage Denials at 2 Health Maintenance
Organizations Journal of the American Medical Association 289 (7): 864-870, http://jama.amaassn.org/cgi/content/full/289/7/864
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KEY ELEMENTS

Matters subject to
review

MEDICAID

•

process standards. Hearings must
be conducted by an impartial
individual. Decisions must be
timely and written. Enrollees must
have an opportunity to represent
themselves or use a representative
of their choice, review their files
and other relevant information,
fully participate in the hearing
process, and receive continued
enrollment.
Eligibility or enrollment, both
initial and subsequent decisions
regarding eligibility.

SCHIP
choice, review their files and other
relevant information, fully participate
in the review process, and receive
continued enrollment.

•

•

•

Health services, including changes
in the type or amount of services.

Impartial review

•

•

Time frames

•

Continuation of
enrollment

•

Hearings must be conducted by
one or more impartial officials or
other individuals not directly
involved in the matter under
review.
Final administrative actions must be
taken within 90 days from the date
the enrollee filed an appeal or from
the date an enrollee filed for direct
access to a state fair hearing, if the
state permits direct access.
Expedited timeframes, applicable
when the enrollee’s health
condition requires, consist of 3
working days from the time the
agency receives the case file from
the MCO or from the time the
agency receives a request directly
from an MCO enrollee.
Coverage continues during an
appeal that is requested in a timely
manner.

Notice

•

States must give at least 10 days
advance written notice of their
intention to terminate, suspend or
reduce eligibility or covered
services, provide the reasons for the
action, and inform enrollees of
their appeal rights.

•

10

•

•

Eligibility or enrollment, including
denial of eligibility, failure to make a
timely eligibility determination and
suspension or termination of
enrollment, including disenrollment
for failure to pay cost-sharing
contributions.
Health services, including delay,
denial, reduction, suspension or
termination of health services,
including the determination about
the type or level of services, and
failure to approve, furnish or provide
payment for health services in a
timely manner.
Independent, external review must
be conducted by the state or a
contractor other than the contractor
responsible for the health services
matter subject to external review.
Reviews must be completed in
accordance with the medical needs
of the patient. A standard timeframe
(applicable when medical needs do
not dictate a shorter time frame)
consists of 90 calendar days from the
date an enrollee requests an internal
or external review. An expedited
timeframe (applicable when medical
needs dictate a shorter time frame)
consists of 72 hours from the time an
enrollee requests an external review
and can be extended to 14 calendar
days at the request of the enrollee.
Coverage continues until the review
of a suspension or termination of
enrollment, including a decision to
disenroll for failure to pay costsharing, is completed.
States must provide timely written
notice of any determination subject
to review, which includes: reasons
for the determination; an
explanation of applicable rights to
review that determination; the
standard and expedited times frames
for review; the manner in which a
review can be requested; and the
circumstances under which

KEY ELEMENTS

MEDICAID

SCHIP
enrollment may continue pending
review.

Source: GW CHSRP, 2003.

B.

State Agency Obligations to Monitor and Enforce Quality Standards

Federal law requires Medicaid and SCHIP agencies to engage in various types of
activities aimed at ensuring health care quality. These obligations, summarized in Figure
4 begin with the development of a contract itself and continue throughout a monitoring
and enforcement phase.
Figure 4. Federal Medicaid and SCHIP Health Care Quality Requirements
FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS
Development of contract

Contractual standards
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MEDICAID

SCHIP

States must use contracts for
coverage or other services that
comply with federal procurement
requirements, which include: (1)
states must provide for
administrative, contractual, and
legal remedies for breaches of
the contract, including
termination; (2) states must grant
access to books, documents,
papers, and records for audit and
examination purposes; (3) states
must monitor and report on
program performance; (4) states
must evaluate contractors’
performance and document
whether they meet the terms,
conditions, and specifications of
the contract. In addition, the
contract must specify the
following: (1) the population
covered by the contract; (2)
enrollment and reenrollment
procedures; (3) amount,
duration and scope of services;
(4) evaluation of quality,
appropriateness and timeliness
of services delivered under the
contract; (5) procedures and
criteria for termination of the
contract; (6) appropriate record
system; (7) confidentiality
protections; (8) third party
liability activities; (9)
subcontract requirements.
States must include standards on
access, structure and operations,
and measurement and
improvement in their contracts
with MCOs. Access standards
include: (1) availability of

States must use contracts for
coverage or other services that
comply with federal procurement
requirements, which include: (1)
states must provide for
administrative, contractual, and
legal remedies for breaches of
the contract, including
termination; (2) states must grant
access to books, documents,
papers, and records for audit and
examination purposes; (3) states
must monitor and report on
program performance; (4) states
must evaluate contractors’
performance and document
whether they meet the terms,
conditions, and specifications of
the contract.

States must abide by the
contractual standards described
above.

FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS

Agency’s monitoring and
enforcement of contract and
contractual standards

MEDICAID
services by providing access to
an adequate provider network,
timely access to services, and
culturally competent services; (2)
coordinated care and continuity
of care; (3) coverage and
authorization of services.
Structure and operation
standards include: (1) provider
selection; (2) enrollee
information; (3) confidentiality;
(4) enrollment and
disenrollment; (5) internal
grievance systems; (6)
subcontracts. Measurement and
improvement standards include:
(1) practice guidelines; (2)
quality assessment and
performance improvement
program. Performance measures
and improvement projects are
not defined, but can be federally
determined; states are not
required to establish minimum
performance levels; and
evaluations can be planconducted or state-conducted or
both.
States must implement a quality
assessment and performance
improvement program, which
they must use to monitor and
evaluate compliance with, at a
minimum, standards of access to
care, structure and operations,
and quality measurement and
improvement. The program must
include an annual, external
independent review of quality
outcomes, timeliness of services,
and access to care. It must also
provide for intermediate
sanctions.

SCHIP

States must ensure quality and
appropriateness of care. They
also must establish and
implement procedures to
investigate and resolve cases of
fraud and abuse.

Source: GW CHSRP, 2003.

In virtually all states, children, including those who are publicly insured, have
basic legal rights to sue for injuries caused by medical negligence.29
Children enrolled in managed care arrangements do have certain grievance and
appeals rights in the event that care is denied or delayed. These appeals systems offer
some opportunity for external oversight of health plan conduct, but as with other
individual legal tools, the grievance and appeals system tends to operate at a late stage
in the health system, when allegedly necessary care already has been delayed or
denied. Although federal law provides protections to ensure rapid reviews in certain
emergency situations, the potential for injury must be imminent in order to invoke a
29

Rosenblatt et al., op.cit.
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fast-track response. Furthermore, it is unclear what impact disparate individual legal
actions have on large systemic quality challenges. An isolated case can take on
enormous significance when the negligence is clear, the case is publicized, and the
award is enormous, but these types of cases are rare. A good quality management
system would consider patterns of complaints and grievances when examining overall
operations but pronounced patterns would be important in such cases.30
In sum, the role of purchasers in fostering the quality of care is key, given the
lack of active federal oversight or individual legal remedies that are effective at the
systemic level. This study examines efforts by state Medicaid and SCHIP agencies to
use their power as the largest purchasers of pediatric health care in the nation to ensure
pediatric health care quality in comprehensive managed care settings. In 2002,
approximately 36 percent of all children were covered by the two programs,31 making
them the most significant purchasers of pediatric care, with the theoretical ability to
influence overall system quality through their expectations and their active enforcement
of these expectations through quality measurement. Medicaid and SCHIP interventions
are particularly important in the case of comprehensive managed care because of the
nature of the managed care systems in which children are enrolled. Because of the
budgetary constraints under which they operate and within which their families live,
Medicaid and SCHIP agencies contract for tightly managed arrangements that permit
only the most limited out-of-network coverage and employ strict forms of utilization
management. The consequences of tight management relative to a population with
elevated health risks can be seen in the broad and detailed contracts that Medicaid and
SCHIP agencies write for their contractors. In earlier studies, we have found that
Medicaid managed care contracts are relatively comprehensive in the areas of health
care access, network capacity and competence, and the general service duties of
managed care organizations toward enrollees.32 The question thus becomes how these
detailed expectations are measured and enforced.
C.

State Contracting Practices and their Enforcement

As previously noted, contracts are a federal requirement when Medicaid and
SCHIP managed care arrangements are used. This requirement of a written agreement
with providers and subcontractors rests not only on the provisions of the two benefits
laws but on general federal grants management rules related to the administration of
federal programs.
In keeping with the broad discretion granted states, the federal government does
not design basic Medicaid and SCHIP managed care contracts for states to use. As a
result, each state develops its own basic agreements that incorporate both federal
standards as well as its own specifications based on local conditions and priorities.
These specifications also reflect state laws related to contracts with private companies,
which can be quite extensive.
30

See, e.g., the National Committee on Quality Assurance, www.ncqa.org
www.kff.org
32
See Rosenbaum, S. et al., Negotiating the New Health System: A Nationwide Study of Medicaid
Managed Care Contracts, 1st-4th editions (1997-2001), Washington, DC: GWU-CHSRP,
http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/managed_care.htm.
31

13

a.

Summary of previous findings

For nearly a decade, the Center for Health Services Research and Policy at The
George Washington University has studied Medicaid and SCHIP managed care contracts
and analyzed and reported on their contents.33 Findings, which have been widely
disseminated over the years, can be summarized as follows: First, in the case of
children, the contracts are comprehensive and reflect not only the coverage standards
of federal law but additional standards of performance that states expect. Second, the
contracts vary tremendously in what they emphasize and prioritize, although less so in
the case of children, perhaps because the federal pediatric standards are themselves
uniform and comprehensive. For example, a state with a high incidence of childhood
lead poisoning may amplify the lead screening provisions of the Medicaid EPSDT
program and set forth very detailed expectations regarding when, how, and where the
screen should occur, the protocols that should be used, and how the data should be
reported. Another state with a limited lead poisoning problem may barely mention lead
screening beyond the minimum requirements.
Third, in the case of Medicaid only (which is far broader than SCHIP in its
coverage requirements) many states contract for less than all required benefits under
federal law, leaving certain types of benefits and coverage either entirely or partially in
the residual Medicaid program. For example, some states may omit certain prescription
drugs from their contracts, or specify levels of nursing home and home health benefits
that are less than the full coverage available to beneficiaries under Medicaid amount,
duration and scope standards.
Fourth, in state Medicaid programs that use multiple “prime contractors” (e.g., a
comprehensive managed care organization and a managed behavioral health
organization), there may be coverage “pockets” or “gaps” between the contracts. These
33

Rosenbaum, S., et al. (1997-2001), Negotiating the New Health System: A Nationwide Study of Medicaid
Managed Care Contracts, Editions 1-4, op cit.; Kamoie, B., Rosenbaum, S., Stange, P., (2003).
Implementation and Management of Public Health Programs in a Managed-Care Legal Framework. Law in
Public Health Practice (R. Goodman, et al., Eds) New York, NY: Oxford University Press; Rosenbaum, S.,
Skivington, S., Praeger, S. (2002). Public Health Emergencies and the Public Health/Managed Care
Challenge. The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 30(3)(supp.): 63-69; Rosenbaum, S., Mauery, R.,
Blake, S., Wehr, E. (2000). Public Health in a Changing Health Care System: Linkages Between Public
Health Agencies and Managed Care Organizations in the Treatment and Prevention of Sexually
Transmitted Diseases. Washington, DC: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation; Rosenbaum, S. (1999).
Approaches for Assuring Access to Quality Health Care Through State Contracts with Managed Care Plans.
Access to Health Care, Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured; Blake, S.,
Wehr, E. (1999). Asthma and Managed Care: A Focused Study of Asthma-Related Medicaid Managed Care
Contract Provisions. Report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Mauery, R., Rosenbaum, S.,
Woolley, Wehr, E., Sofaer, S. (1998). An Evaluation of Emerging Relationships Through Memoranda of
Understanding Between Managed Care Organizations and Public Health Agencies: Implications for
Population-Based Communicable Disease Prevention and Control Programs and Public Health Policy.
Washington, DC: GWU Center for Health Services Research and Policy; Rosenbaum, S., (1998).
Negotiating the New Health System: Purchasing Publicly Accountable Managed Care. American Journal
of Preventative Medicine, 14:3S; Blake, S., Rosenbaum, S., Wehr, E. (1997). Contract Specifications for
Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD) Services in Medicaid Managed Care Plans. A Focused Study. Atlanta,
GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Rosenbaum, S., Richards, T. (Summer 1996). Medicaid
Managed Care and Public Health Policy. Journal Public Health Management Practice 2(3): 76-82.
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also can exist when a single comprehensive contract contains certain ambiguities and
must be interpreted against the residual coverage under the state plan. These gaps –
which tend to be an inevitable problem when the less-than-precise art of contract
drafting meets the complexity of federal law – are of obvious importance to all parties to
the agreement as well as those on whose behalf the agreement is written or who are
paid through the agreement. Ambiguities in drafting can lead to ambiguities regarding
who is at financial risk for costly services. Contractors may be unclear as to where their
service duties begin and end. Providers may be unclear regarding who will pay them
for their services, the state or a contractor. Comprehensive and behavioral contractors
may disagree over the point at which the former company’s mental health service duties
end and the specialty system’s begin, with resulting dilemmas for providers in the two
systems. And finally of course, the beneficiaries of these agreements may confront a
situation in which everyone – the state, the contractors, and the network providers –
disavows responsibility to manage and pay for particular conditions. This type of
confusion may be most evident in the case of children with complex and co-occurring
mental and physical conditions, whose management is challenging to begin with and
whose families must navigate several distinct systems – their comprehensive health plan
coverage, their behavioral health plan coverage in the case of states that use behavioral
providers,34 and the state plan.
Our previous analysis found that because coverage is narrower and predicated
on a commercial insurance model, SCHIP programs tend to buy all services from single
contractors, thereby removing this layer of complexity that is part of Medicaid managed
care.35 However, the same problem of drafting ambiguities can still be decisively
present. Since state SCHIP agencies are at risk for coverage and payment of all services
enumerated in their state plans (unless and until a service is removed) a state SCHIP
agency and its contractors can find themselves in similar coverage disputes. States and
their contractors similarly can find themselves in disagreement over the meaning of noncoverage provisions of SCHIP agreements, such as provisions related to access and
quality.
Because Medicaid and SCHIP contracts are comprehensive and because, as
discussed in the previous section, the primary role in contracts and their enforcement is
assigned to state agencies, it is important to understand both the powers that state
agencies have to pursue contract enforcement as well as the process of enforcement
itself. The importance of state activities in this area is magnified by the limited
enforcement capabilities that children have on their own, as well as by the outright
prohibition against third party contract enforcement imposed by many states and by the
limitations described above on individual enforcement inherent in the federal law of
individual rights.

34

See Rosenbaum, S., Mauery, D.R., Teitelbaum, J. (August 2001). Issue Brief 14: An Overview of Legal
Developments in Managed Care Caselaw and Selected Case Studies of Legal Developments in State
Contracting for Managed Behavioral Health Services, Washington, DC: GWU Center for Health Services
Research and Policy, http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/behavioral_health/bhib-14.pdf.
35
Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System, op.cit.; Rosenbaum, S., Shaw, K., Sonosky, C.
(December 2001) Managed Care Purchasing under SCHIP: A Nationwide Analysis of Freestanding SCHIP
Contracts SCHIP Policy Brief #3, Washington, DC: GWU Center for Health Services Research and Policy,
http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/SCHIP_brief3.pdf
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b.

Contract design and enforcement

Drawing on a unique database maintained by the George Washington University
Center for Health Services Research and Policy (CHSRP)36 , we reviewed the mechanisms
for enforcing compliance with pediatric performance standards that are internal to the
risk contracts between Medicaid and SCHIP purchasers and MCOs. The analysis
focused on contracts in effect as of March 31, 2000 in 16 states: Arizona, California,
Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin. Twelve of these states
are also the focus of the Urban Institute’s Assessing the New Federalism project.37 The
remaining four are among the states that have communities being tracked by the Center
for the Study of Health Systems Change.38 Together, these states represent 58 percent of
all Medicaid beneficiaries and 53 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in MCOs in
2001. Similarly, they represent over 90 percent of the 3.25 million SCHIP beneficiaries
enrolled in MCOS in 2001.39 This analysis focuses on remedies and enforcement
involving comprehensive MCOs and does not examine enforcement against individual
practitioners. In addition, we focused on enforcement rather than incentivization in this
review, since our goal was to determine the remedies that exist where a state concludes
that perhaps in spite of incentivization,40 non-compliance is a problem that must be
addressed.
The analysis focused on contractual remedies, however states have other tools
that can be used to enforce contract standards. These include state licensure laws
aimed at assuring that only health plans with certain capabilities are eligible to bid for
state-financed managed care contracts, anti-fraud statutes aimed at both civil and
criminal conduct, and other general laws relevant to consumer protection. These laws
are extremely important and act as an overarching legal framework for the Medicaid
managed care agreement itself.
For purposes of this review, we identified remedies typically used in Medicaid
and SCHIP contracts in conjunction with a pediatric performance standard based on the
requirement under Medicaid statute and regulation that children receive appropriate
immunizations according to the schedule recommended by the CDC Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices.41 Our prior reviews of Medicaid and SCHIP
contracts42 revealed 11 basic types of remedies that one or more state Medicaid and or
36
The CHSRP contract database, assembled with support from the David and Lucille Packard
Foundation,
contains Medicaid and SCHIP contracts in effect on March 31, 2000, Negotiating the New Health System,
4th Edition, www.gwhealthpolicy.org/managed_care.htm.
37
The Urban Institute’s Assessing the New Federalism study covers 13 states (AL, CA, CO, FL, MA, MI, MN,
MS, NJ, NY, TX, WA, WI and DC), http://www.urban.org. Because Alabama did not enter into any risk
contracts with MCOs during 2000, it is not included in this analysis.
38
The Center for the Study of Health Systems Change is studying 12 communities, including Phoenix, AZ;
Indianapolis, IN; Cleveland, OH; and Greenville, SC. http://www.hschange.org/.
39
http://www.cms.gov/medicaid/managedcare/mcsten02.pdf Data as of June 30, 2002.;
http://www.cms.gov/schip/ and Austein Casnoff, op.cit.
40
See Bailit Health Purchasing, LLC (March, 2002) Recommended Health Care Markets for Provider
Incentive Demonstrations, http://www.nhcpi.net/pdf/incentives.pdf, regarding the use of incentives in
Medicaid managed care.
41
Section 1905(r)(1)(B)(iii); 42 C.F.R. 441.56(c)(3).
42
GW Center for Health Services Research and Policy, Negotiating the New Health System: State Children’s
Health Insurance Programs, Fourth Edition, Washington, DC: The George Washington University, Center
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SCHIP agencies have incorporated into their contracts with MCOs in order to enforce
compliance with the requirements of the contract.43 These remedies are set forth below.
Figure 5. Managed Care Contractual Remedies
Types of Remedies in State Medicaid and SCHIP
Risk Contracts with MCOs
Corrective action plans
Liquidated/exemplary damages
Suspension of new enrollment
Disenrollment of current enrollees
Withholding from capitation payments
MCO payment for out-of-plan care
State payment to out-of-plan provider
Adjusting capitation payment rates
Receivership by state Medicaid agency
Termination or non-renewal of contract
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org

There is a dramatic difference between contract termination and any of the other
remedies listed above. Termination represents the end of the business relationship
between the state purchaser and the MCO; if the MCO does not have a significant
enrollment of individuals who are not Medicaid or SCHIP beneficiaries, then termination
also represents the commercial demise of the MCO. Because termination is such a
harsh remedy, it is not commonly invoked; instead, purchasers rely on the imposition
(or the threat of imposition) of intermediate sanctions to deter noncompliance with
contract requirements and, when noncompliance occurs, to cure it.
The use of intermediate sanctions has particular logic in the case of pediatric
performance standards, for example the CDC Advisory Committee’s childhood
immunization specifications. This performance standard is an important marker of the
extent to which an MCO is complying with Medicaid program requirements as well as
the quality of pediatric care the MCO offers. However, this performance standard does
not measure the range of the MCO’s responsibilities vis-à-vis its child enrollees, and an
MCO that does not meet the immunization performance standard could be performing
most of its other pediatric care responsibilities adequately. In such circumstances,
contract termination would serve no useful purpose. The imposition of one or more
intermediate remedies that target and are proportionate to the performance standard and
the degree of noncompliance is likely to be much more effective at inducing
compliance by the MCO.

for Health Services Research and Policy,
http://www.gwu.edu/~chsrp/Fourth_Edition/CHIP/schiptoc.html.
43
Ibid., Table 6.4.
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A similar review of contracts in effect in 2000 between state SCHIP agencies and
MCOs found that these contracts contained 9 of the 11 types of remedies present in the
Medicaid risk contracts. In this prior review, we identified two notable remedies
available to Medicaid purchasers but not incorporated into SCHIP contracts that exist
independent of the Medicaid agreement under separately administered SCHIP programs.
These two remedies involve situations in which a company’s network is unable to
furnish contractual care, a problem that is by no means unique to Medicaid (indeed,
access to out-of-network providers is a major focus of state managed care oversight
generally).44 The remedies permit an agency to either require the MCO to pay for
contractual care that it cannot furnish through its own network or to pay for the out-ofnetwork care and recoup from the contractor. The potential for network failure
apparently was less of a concern to state SCHIP agencies, since these remedies did not
appear in the SCHIP contracts.

44

Butler, P. (August, 2001). Comparison of State Managed Care Liability Laws. Washington, DC: Kaiser
Family Foundation, http://www.kff.org/content/2001/3155/MCOReport.pdf.
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c.

Sanctions in Medicaid and SCHIP Managed Care Contracts, 2000

In our review of the 16 focus states in this study, we examined contracts in effect
during the 2000 time period. Figure 6 illustrates the frequency of contractual recourse to
seven specified remedies for ten SCHIP states and 15 Medicaid states. Tables A.I
through A.IV below provide details on the various intermediate sanctions that appear in
the two groups of contracts and compare Medicaid and SCHIP agency approaches. A
discussion of the remedies and the tables follow. Additional tables are in Appendix I.
Overview
Type of remedy by frequency. The most frequently described remedy for
noncompliance in both the SCHIP and Medicaid contracts is termination or non-renewal
of the contract. Unlike Medicaid, however, withholding from capitation payments was
the remedy least frequently described in SCHIP managed care contracts. The majority of
SCHIP contracts cited recourse to corrective action plans; this was the second most
frequently cited sanction in SCHIP contracts and the sixth for Medicaid. Three of the
seven SCHIP contracts and 14 of the 15 Medicaid contracts also included suspension of
Figure 6. Percent of States with Contractual Recourse to Specified
Remedies in Medicaid and SCHIP Contracts
Corrective action plans
L iquidated or exemplary damages
Suspension of new enrollment
Disenrollment of current enrollees
Withholding from capitation payments

SCHIP
Medicaid

MCO payment for out-of-plan care
State payment to out-of-plan provider
Adjusting capitation payment rates
Receivership by state Medicaid agency
T ermination or non-renewal of contract
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent

SCHIP: n = 7
Medicaid: n = 15

new enrollment and liquidated or exemplary damages as remedies for noncompliance.
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State payments to out-of-plan providers recouped from plans and mandatory
MCO payment for out-of-plan care were the remedies least frequently described in
Medicaid managed care contracts and neither is cited by any of the SCHIP contracts
analyzed. SCHIP contracts did not contain the following remedies: receivership,
adjustment of capitation rates, state payment to out-of-plan provider recouped from
MCO, MCO payment for out-of-plan care, and disenrollment of current enrollees. Like
Medicaid, a general and nonspecific failure to comply with the contract was
systematically one of the top reasons for employing the remedy.
Total number of remedies by state. Massachusetts Medicaid included the most
number of available remedies in the contract, while California and Michigan were the
states with the lowest number of remedies available. The California SCHIP contract,
however, contained the highest number of remedies of all the SCHIP contracts
analyzed. Similar to Medicaid, Michigan was one of two states with the lowest number
of remedies included in the separate SCHIP contract.
Individual Remedies and the Uppermost Reasons for Imposing Them
Corrective action plans.
Seven Medicaid contracts included language for
imposing corrective action plans. The most frequently cited reasons for requesting such
plans included failure to comply with the contract and failure to provide quality care.
Four SCHIP contracts authorized the use of corrective action plans, most frequently in
response to a failure to comply with the contract. Other reasons for the use of
corrective action plans identified in SCHIP contracts were knowledge that
representations or warranties regarding a participating provider may be untrue or
incorrect, hindrance of enrollee access to covered services due to inability of providers
within the plan to accept additional enrollees as patients, and a deficiency or event
causing an assessment of a liquidated damage.
Liquidated or exemplary damages. The majority of Medicaid states and three
SCHIP states included provisions in their Medicaid contracts on liquidated or exemplary
damages to sanction a variety of MCO behaviors. The most frequently described basis
for imposing this type of remedy in Medicaid contracts was MCO failure to comply with
the contract, followed closely by MCO failure to submit data, medical records, or other
information or to submit them in the required form or format by a specified deadline,
and MCO failure to comply with federal laws and regulations. For SCHIP, the most
frequently cited basis for instituting this remedy was failure to comply with objective
performance standards monitored by the state.
Suspension of new enrollment. The majority of Medicaid and three SCHIP states
gave the Medicaid or SCHIP agency the contractual authority to suspend new
enrollment. Principal reasons for suspending enrollment were failure to comply with
the contract (Medicaid and SCHIP); and, failure to comply with marketing guidelines
and failure to comply with state laws and regulations (Medicaid only).
Disenrollment of current enrollees. Six states used disenrollment of current
enrollees as a remedy against participating MCOs. The most frequently cited reasons for
imposing this remedy were failure to comply with the contract and the failure to provide
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services, followed by failure to comply with federal laws and regulations and failure to
maintain or provide records. None of the SCHIP contracts included this remedy.
Withholding from capitation payments. While the majority of Medicaid states
included withholding from capitation payments as a sanction under certain
circumstances, only two SCHIP states included such a remedy in their contracts. Most
often, Medicaid contracts cited failure to comply with the contract, failure to provide
medically necessary services, discrimination in employment, and termination as reasons
for withholding from capitation payments. Other reasons included failure to comply
with federal laws and regulations, failure to comply with state laws and regulations,
failure to comply with financial soundness requirements, failure to comply with
reporting requirements, misrepresentation or falsification of information, and failure to
comply with physician incentive plan requirements. The two SCHIP states included
failure to comply with the contract and failure to make payments to the Consumer
Assessment of Health Plans (CAHPS) vendor for reasons for employing this sanction.
MCO payment for out-of-plan care. Only one Medicaid contract required MCOs to
pay for out-of-plan care when they failed to comply with the contract or failed to
comply with laws and regulations.
Recoupment of state payment to out-of-plan providers. Only one Medicaid contract
had the contractual authority to recoup from MCOs state payments to out-of-plan
providers for failure to reimburse covered services after receiving a monthly prepayment
to provide these services and when an enrollee has moved outside of the MCO’s service
area.
Adjustment of capitation rates. Nine Medicaid contracts included the option to
adjust capitation rates as a remedy against plan violations, most frequently in response
to a failure to comply with the contract or a failure to submit data. None of the SCHIP
contracts analyzed described this remedy.
Receivership. Five Medicaid contracts described receivership as one option
against specified MCO behavior, such as failure to comply with the contract, failure to
comply with federal laws and regulations, MCO action amounting to egregious behavior,
and MCO action posing a substantial risk to the health of enrollees.
Termination. All Medicaid states and all but one SCHIP state included
termination clauses in their contracts both for contractor violations and other reasons
independent of contractor behavior. In the long list of contractor violations, failure to
comply with the contract, failure to maintain financial viability or meet financial
soundness requirements, loss of qualification for licensure, certificate of authority, or
certification, failure to comply with federal laws and regulations, and unremedied
breach within a specified time period topped the list for Medicaid. The protection of
enrollees from injury, the best interest of the state, and the protection of state or federal
funds or property were the top three other reasons enabling states to terminate the
contract. Top contractor violations in SCHIP contracts included failure to comply with
the contract, failure to meet statutory financial requirements or to comply with solvency
requirements, and assignment for the benefit of creditors, appointment of receiver, or
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bankruptcy proceedings. Lack of funding or appropriated funds was the leading other
reason enabling states to terminate the contract.
State Law Remedies External to Contract
Contracts between state Medicaid or SCHIP purchasers and MCOs are governed
primarily by state and federal Medicaid and SCHIP laws. These laws may be expressly
referenced in the contracts or may be covered in a broad reference to “all applicable
state and federal laws and regulations.”
Other state laws also apply to these
arrangements or to the MCO doing business with the state Medicaid agency. For
example, most states have laws requiring MCOs doing business in the state to obtain a
license, and some states have enacted legislation prohibiting the submission of false
claims by Medicaid providers. These other laws, in turn, contain remedies for
noncompliance with their requirements. These remedies, however, are not tools that
will realistically enable state purchasing agencies, other state regulatory officials, or the
state courts to hold MCO contractors accountable for compliance with pediatric
performance standards.
Medicaid Law
States that contract on a risk basis with MCOs are required under federal law to
“establish” intermediate sanctions in connection with certain specific offenses.45 Federal
law is silent as to whether the intermediate sanctions are contained in statute, regulation,
or in the risk contract itself. At a minimum, the state Medicaid agency must have
available to it the following two intermediate sanctions: appointment of temporary
management; and permitting enrollees to disenroll without cause and notifying the
enrollees of their right to do so.46 The state may also adopt one or more of the
following intermediate sanctions: civil money penalties; suspension of new enrollment
(including default enrollment); and suspension of capitation payments until the reason
for the sanction no longer exists and is not likely to re-occur.47 States may establish
additional sanctions at their discretion.48 States are not required to impose intermediate
sanctions except in one circumstance: if the state finds that an MCO “has repeatedly
failed
to
meet”
federal
statutory
requirements.49

45
Section 1932(e)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act, as implemented by 42 CFR 438.700. States must be in
compliance by June 13, 2003, 67 Fed. Reg. 40989 (June 14, 2002).
46
67 Fed. Reg. 41067; 42 CFR 483.706(b). States must be in compliance by June 13, 2003, 67 Fed. Reg.
40989 (June 14, 2002).
47
42 CFR 438.702(a). States must be in compliance by June 13, 2003, 67 Fed. Reg. 40989 (June 14, 2002).
48
42 CFR 438.702(b).
49
Section 1932(e)(3) of the Social Security Act, as implemented by 42 CFR 438.706(b). States must be in
compliance by June 13, 2003, 67 Fed. Reg. 40989 (June 14, 2002).
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Part II.

State Experiences with Monitoring Contract Enforcement

Considerable attention has been paid to the development of clinical performance
measurement and initiatives aimed at upgrading the clinical quality of care around key
health problems (e.g., under-immunization, pediatric asthma). But far less attention has
been devoted to the study of how these quality improvement efforts become integrated
with the elements of contractor accountability: specification, compensation, and
performance oversight, including direct access to patient protections.
Studies on monitoring and enforcement of Medicaid managed care are sparse as
are studies of monitoring SCHIP contractor performance (this is not surprising, given the
recent nature of the SCHIP program). One GAO study focused on four states’ general
efforts in monitoring Medicaid managed care programs and ensuring plan compliance
with the access and data collection requirements of the contracts. 50 That study,
however, did not focus on pediatric health care. A second, more recent GAO study
examined efforts to implement Medicaid EPSDT services in five states.51 This second
study did not examine contractual enforcement, although it theorized certain managed
care-related contractual enforcement strategies as a means of improving access and
quality. Other recent studies have focused on specific components of managed care
performance monitoring, such as the use of performance incentives, early warning
systems, and data reporting.52 Again, these studies are not specific to pediatric health
care and do not tie these approaches to contracting practices. At the same time, the
small body of research that does exist suggests that compliance monitoring matters and
that noncompliance is a problem.
This phase of our analysis attempts to fill this gap by examining state contractual
monitoring practices under Medicaid and SCHIP by combining an analysis of
contractual provisions with interviews with state officials regarding their experiences in
monitoring and enforcing two specific pediatric health standards.
A.

Study Design

This phase of the study explores: 1) the logic behind a state’s selection of certain
conditions to emphasize in its contractual specifications; 2) similarities and differences
in how states with comparable areas of child health emphasis approach enforcement; 3)
the extent to which the contracts were written to reflect existing standards, or modify or
replace current standards; and 4) how states developed their expectations regarding
contractor performance and monitored actual performance against those expectations.
50
General Accounting Office, Medicaid Managed Care: Challenge of Holding Plans Accountable Requires
Greater State Effort (GAO/HEHS-97-86, 1997), http://www.gao.gov.
51
General Accounting Office, Medicaid: Stronger Efforts Needed to Ensure Children’s Access to Health
Screening Services (GAO-01-749, 2001), http://www.gao.gov.
52
See, e.g., Dyer, M.B., Bailit, M., and Kokenyesi, C. (2002). Are Incentives Effective in Improving the
Performance of Managed Care Plans? Washington, DC: Center for Health Care Strategies,
http://www.chcs.org/publications/pdf/ips/bailitperformance.pdf; Dichter, H, M.D., (2002). Monitoring
Medicaid Managed Care via an Early Warning Program. Washington, DC: Center for Health Care
Strategies, http://www.chcs.org/publications/pdf/ips/earlywarning.pdf.
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Because of the sheer breadth of managed care contracts, as well as our desire to
delve beyond generalized assertions regarding enforcement and to examine
enforcement experiences in the context of actual childhood health conditions, we
selected two pediatric health condition “markers” for analysis. Following consultation
with pediatric experts, examination of the contracts themselves, and a review of
literature on child health, we selected markers of child health that are tied to both high
prevalence and low prevalence child health conditions, and represented in Medicaid
and SCHIP managed care contracts in terms of reasonably clear contractual
specifications, thereby lending themselves to an exploration of state oversight
experiences. Our assumption was that if a state was sufficiently concerned with a
particular child health condition to address it with some specificity in the contract, the
condition presumably would be one that a state intended to focus on as part of its
oversight efforts.
We selected conditions that not only were representative of both high and low
prevalence problems but that also, in their comprehensiveness as reflected in the
contracts, suggested a state’s desire to move beyond what a contractor might be
expected to do as a matter of professional industry custom. In any Medicaid managed
care contract, one would expect that managed care contractors would adhere to
professional health practice in the provision of both low and high prevalence pediatric
care. The fact that states choose to emphasize certain services at length suggests that
they wish to maintain a special and elevated focus on a particular child health problem
above and beyond what professional custom alone might produce.
The study design was qualitative and combined document analyses of state
managed care contracts and other legal documents with semi-structured telephone
interviews with officials from Medicaid and SCHIP agencies, as well as other agencies
involved in contract oversight, when appropriate.
Pediatric standards of care and performance standards related to these standards
of care were selected to represent standards common to all pediatric managed care
arrangements and to reflect both high and low prevalence childhood conditions. The
two conditions that we selected were oral disease and childhood lead poisoning. Figure
7 describes the prevalences and the potential sequelae of oral disease and lead
poisoning.
Figure 7. Comparison of the Prevalence of Oral Disease and Lead Poisoning53
Prevalence of
oral disease
(high
prevalence
condition)

Oral diseases and conditions can have serious short-term and long-term consequences for
a child’s growth, function, ability to learn, self-image, and employability. Today, tooth
decay is the single most common chronic childhood disease, affecting approximately 20%
of preschoolers, 50% of 6-8 year olds, and 75% of 15 year olds. The prevalence of
dental caries is higher for low-income children. Analyses of data from a nationally
representative sample of children show that the amount of tooth decay in children is
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Sources: Children’s Dental Health Project (2003). At-a-Glance Pediatric Oral Health & Oral Health
Disparities; At-a-Glance Medicaid & SCHIP Dental Programs, http://www.childent.org; American Dental
Association (2003). Fact Sheet—Children’s Dental Disease, http://www.ada.org; Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. (2000). Blood Lead Levels in Young Children—United States and Selected States,
1996-1999, http:/www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4950a3.htm.
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Prevalence of
lead poisoning
(low prevalence
condition)

inversely related to income level, suggesting that Medicaid children have a higher
prevalence of dental caries than SCHIP children, who in turn have a higher prevalence of
dental caries than higher income children not enrolled in SCHIP. Data by state are not
readily available.
***The Healthy People 2010 Objective 21-1 is to reduce the proportion of children and
adolescents who experience dental caries in their primary or permanent teeth.
Lead poisoning has the potential to damage a child’s central nervous system, kidneys, and
reproductive system. At high levels, it is associated with decreased intelligence, impaired
neurobehavioral development and hearing acuity, decreased stature and growth, and
sometimes, death. Today, lead poisoning is a low prevalence condition. Blood lead
levels are highest for younger children and for children who are poor (i.e., with family
incomes below 100% of the federal poverty level). In 1999-2000, 300,000 children ages
1-5, or approximately 2% of children in that age group, had elevated blood lead levels,
representing a 2.4% drop since 1991-1994. In 1991-1994, the prevalence of lead
poisoning among Medicaid-covered children ages 1-5 was 9%, compared to 3% among
children not covered by Medicaid. Aggregate SCHIP data are not available, but
presumably would show a prevalence among SCHIP-covered children lower than that for
Medicaid yet higher than for the general population. The estimated prevalence of
elevated blood lead levels across seven of the nine study states ranges from a low of
3.8% to a high of 16%, with a midpoint estimate of 7.4% (the rate for the two remaining
states is unknown). Within states, the prevalence rate varies considerably as well. For
example, in one state, where the statewide prevalence rate is approximately 13%, the
proportion of children with elevated blood lead levels ranges from a low of 1.3% to a
high of 27.3%, depending on the county.
***The Healthy People 2010 Objective 8-11 is to eliminate elevated blood lead levels in
children.

Oral disease represents one of the most prevalent and disparate conditions
affecting low income children, with both short-term and long-term consequences.54
There is an extensive body of literature on the problem,55 as well as practice guidelines
that define accepted interventions at preventive, acute, long term and emergency care
stages.56 Oral health improvement has been a specific quality improvement target
among federal and state Medicaid agencies and many managed care plans have been
involved in oral health improvement efforts.57 Oral health also is a specific service
mentioned in 39 of the 42 comprehensive physical health Medicaid contracts and 13 of
the 15 SCHIP contracts in our contracts database.58
The second condition selected was blood lead levels sufficiently elevated to
require treatment.
This condition was selected because of its public health
importance,59 its long-term effects on children,60 its recognized severity as a condition
requiring immediate treatment,61 and the intensity of focus that has been given to the
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threat of lead poisoning in low-income communities at both the federal and state levels
over the years.62
Sixteen states encompassing 27 Medicaid managed care and separate SCHIP
programs with full-risk managed care contracts in existence (whether these contracts are
separate from each other or integrated with each other) were included for potential
participation in the study: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, Texas, Ohio,
Washington, and Wisconsin. These states mirror those studied by the previously
mentioned Urban Institute and Center for Studying Health Systems Change in their
ongoing studies of federalism and market change. They also comprise more than half
of the nation’s population, and a broad range of fiscal capacity, child well-being,
managed care markets, and approaches to government programs.
A total of nine states and 15 programs (eight Medicaid managed care programs
and seven separate SCHIP programs) chose to participate in the study, representing a
response rate of 56 percent. The remaining seven states declined to participate for
various reasons.63
B.

Data Collection and Methods

Data were collected and analyzed according to a theoretical framework
developed from a combination of sources, including the literature on policy
implementation and the available research on oversight in a Medicaid managed care
context. The theoretical framework delineates the key components of an effective state
monitoring plan and incorporates ten elements that have been identified by
implementation theorists as important to successful implementation (see Figure 8). It is
important to note that this framework was not prescriptive but rather a guide for
conducting the study and developing the research questions (see interview guide,
attached).
Figure 8. Key Components of an Effective State Monitoring Plan64
Formal Plan with Clear
Goals, Assignments,
Measurements, and

Policy goals have been clearly stated (element one); precise standards for
measuring compliance with policy goals have been specified (element
two); agency for implementing and enforcing the policy has been set up
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Reasons given for declining to participate included: the legislative session and the demands it
imposed on the agency; current fiscal pressures; shortage of staff; structure of the program, which did not
lend itself to what was perceived as a useful contribution to the study; absence of focus of the quality
improvement plan on lead poisoning and oral health or the beginning of the development of a plan on
lead poisoning and oral health; low levels of managed care participation in the program; a belief in
improving quality through other means than the contract; or the perceived lack of utility of research such
as this for an individual state.
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Milestones

Prevention Strategies

Coordination Strategies

Detection Strategies

Enforcement Strategies
Reporting Strategies

(element four); multi-faceted support exists toward the policy goals, i.e., the
personnel responsible for implementation are committed to promoting the
policy goals (element five), those enforcing the policy enjoy the support of
their superiors (element six), and the policy beneficiaries are organized and
cohesively support implementation of the policy goals (element seven).
Strategies to prevent implementation problems, including specifying
contract requirements in the following areas: service components and
service periodicity schedule; adequacy of provider network, travel
distances, and waiting times; and adequacy of medical care provided and
beneficiary satisfaction.
The various agencies responsible for achieving the policy goals
administratively coordinate their efforts (element eight).
A mechanism for monitoring compliance has been created (element three);
quantifiable standards have been developed to measure performance and
information is collected to measure plan compliance with standard; analysis
and investigation are independently conducted by the state or other
external organization rather than plan-conducted.
General approach is proactive, systematic, ongoing rather than reactive,
periodic; incentives and penalties favor compliance (element nine).
Federal government is an active participant on behalf of those protected by
the policy (element ten); state reports back to the federal government for
additional sanctions beyond the purview of the state.

Data were collected from two main sources of information. First, service and
enforcement provisions found in Medicaid and SCHIP managed care contracts collected
for CHSRP’s ongoing study entitled “Negotiating the New Health Care System,”65 as well
as federal and state laws, including federal and state Medicaid statutes and regulations,
federal and state SCHIP statutes and regulations, federal and state HMO acts, and federal
and state procurement laws, when appropriate.
The second source of information consisted of telephone interviews with state
government officials that were used to complete, corroborate, and clarify the
documentary evidence.
In these interviews, we discussed specific contract
requirements, state oversight activities, and state actions available or taken as a result of
monitoring.66 A wide range of officials were included, including both Medicaid and
SCHIP agency staff.67 We sought information about contract enforcement issues state
officials faced as well as information on the extent to which contract drafting created
additional problems in enforcement. This last point was of particular interest; since we
began the contracts project nearly a decade ago, we have given specific focus to noting
potential ramifications of vague language from an enforcement viewpoint.
Data were analyzed across states to describe the logic of Medicaid and SCHIP
contract performance standards selection and the similarities and differences in state
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monitoring plans by degree of managed care penetration, type of program design, and
prevalence of the condition targeted by the contractual performance standard.
C.

Analysis of Contract and Interview Findings

a.

Medicaid and SCHIP Contract Performance Standards Selection

In this part, we analyze how state contracts reinforce existing professional
standards and industry norms and develop new standards of care that attempt to raise
the bar in health care quality for children.
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1.

Dental Care

Typically, in the private sector, dental services are not included in the contractual
obligations of managed care organizations. Rather, they are optional and furnished
through alternate systems of care. In contrast, in the Medicaid program, at least in the
case of children, states must cover EPSDT services, which include oral screenings and
referrals to dentists as part of the physical examination required under the program. In
addition, other necessary care (i.e., diagnosis, treatment) discovered by the screen
should be covered. At a minimum, other dental care should include emergency,
preventive and therapeutic services, as defined in law, to relieve pain and infections,
restore teeth, and maintain dental health.
States must provide dental services at intervals that meet reasonable standards of
medical and dental practice and should consult with recognized medical and dental
organizations involved in children’s health care in setting these standards. However,
there are differences of opinion among these professional associations on what the
periodicity schedule should look like. The American Dental Association (ADA),
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP),68 and American Academy of Family Physicians
(AAFP) recommend a direct referral to a dentist at age 3 or earlier if medically necessary
and greater frequency of dental visits than physical examinations for older children (a
practice also supported, albeit no longer required, by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS)). The American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry (AAPD), on
the other hand, recommends a dental visit within six months of the eruption of the first
tooth and no later than a child’s first birthday, and subsequently a minimum of two
visits per year.
Generally speaking, separate SCHIP programs have more flexibility to determine
which benefits they will cover.
SCHIP requires states to provide benefits that are
actuarially-equivalent to a benchmark benefit package (e.g., state employee benefit plan)
for basic services, which must include well-baby and well-child care. Unlike Medicaid,
dental care is not specifically listed as a component of well-baby and well-child care in
the SCHIP program.
We asked state Medicaid and SCHIP officials why they set the oral health
standards as they had in the contract. The most striking difference came from the
fact that Medicaid programs, including SCHIP Medicaid expansion programs, and
separate SCHIP programs are governed by two separate sets of rules.
Medicaid officials almost uniformly cited the federal ESPDT requirements as the
driving force for their oral health standards. While the majority of these officials
believed that, or did not venture a guess as to whether, their standards reflected current
federal requirements, professional standards, and industry norms, officials in two states
thought theirs went a step further because they had “beefed up” the existing preventive
guidelines with additional requirements.
In the first state, officials added two
requirements: 1) that primary care physicians perform oral screens at each well-child
68
Since this research took place, the AAP changed its policy and joined the AAPD in recommending the
establishment of a dental home by referring a child for an oral health examination by a dentist 6months
after the first tooth erupts or by 12 months of age.
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visit and refer children to dental services when necessary, and 2) that managed care
organizations guarantee open access or self-referral to oral health services for children
and notify families when the annual visit is due.
In the second state, officials further defined what the examination of the oral
cavity should entail, by requiring that medical providers “look at the teeth” not just the
tonsils, perform various educational activities, and refer to dental providers using “First
Tooth, First Birthday, First Dental Visit” as a guide for the age of referral, an approach
similar to the one recommended by the AAPD. The state still faces difficulties with the
referral component because the AMA, ADA, and AAPD differ on the age of referral
(e.g., one says age three, the other with the sighting of the disease) and because
providers remain confused as to which standard applies.
SCHIP officials, on the other hand, pointed to the flexibility of the SCHIP statute
and regulations, which do not set federal standards in the area of oral health. The three
separate SCHIP programs represented in this study all covered dental care and explicitly
listed components of that care in their contracts. Two of these three programs also
referred in their contracts to a specific periodicity schedule for providers to follow, the
AAP schedule in the first case and the AAPD schedule in the second case. The third
contract was silent on this issue, but the state official representing the program
explained that the dental care component was based in large part on the Medicaid
managed care model, particularly in the area of oral health assessments, which requires
plans to follow the AAP periodicity schedule. One state official believed that their
dental care standards went beyond industry norms because they had used the state
employee benefit plan as a benchmark for the SCHIP benefit package and augmented it
with the AAP standard of “screen and refer at age three.” State officials in the second
state thought their standards reflected industry practice because the choice of the AAPD
standard was based on the recommendations to the Commission set up to design the
SCHIP program by a dentist. The state official in the third state was unsure whether
theirs represented an advance beyond existing standards.
We asked state Medicaid and SCHIP officials how the pediatric oral health
standards contained in their managed care contracts were arrived at and
negotiated with contractors. There were basically two groups of states: those that
made the pediatric oral health standards of their contracts nonnegotiable and those that
negotiated them in some fashion. Half of the states fell into the first group and did not
negotiate this aspect of the contract because it was in essence predetermined by the
EPSDT requirements at the federal level or it was added to the RFP as a minimum,
nonnegotiable requirement. The other half of the states took varied approaches to
negotiation and involved health plans at different stages of the process, but they all
underscored that it facilitated buy-in on the part of health plans and thus lessened the
opposition of health plans to the oral health standards that resulted in the contract.
Three states involved health plans early on in the development stage of the standards
either through formal discussions where the state entity responsible for setting policy on
oral health made the final decision or through informal discussions where group
decisions were made based on the best dental practice in existence at the time. A
fourth state involved health plans at the RFP stage, which, according to state officials,
provided a forum for health plans to voice their concerns. In that state, during the RFP
process, the state proposed a set of performance measures for dental and well-child
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care and the plans suggested national Health Employer Data Information Set (HEDIS)
measures instead. In the end, the state adopted a set of measures very similar to
HEDIS.
Finally, we asked agency officials how important the capacity to measure
the standard was and what was the anticipated approach to performance
measurement. We found that although the majority of states expected health plans to
show improvement from year to year, the level of sophistication of states’ approaches to
measuring health plan performance and compliance with the pediatric oral health
standards of the contract varied widely from state to state (Table 1 in Appendix II).
Eight programs had developed one or more clinical performance measures, and of
those, three had made them specific to dental care, and five relied on the broader
EPSDT well-child visit measure. In addition, half of those that did not have measures
specific to dental care also used dental statistics to track the utilization rate of dental
services. Two programs did not have any performance measures in place, but both
used dental statistics to track the rate of dental services. State officials in the ninth state
explained that, because of the very low level of managed care penetration in the state,
they decided to focus on ensuring access to care and to address quality improvement
later when it would be a more feasible proposition. To that end, they developed a
quantifiable geographic access standard (e.g., 90 percent of children must have access
to a pediatrician within 10 miles of their homes). Though specific to pediatric care, it
does not address access to dental providers.
2.

Lead Screening Services

Generally, the perception in the private sector—health plans and health
professionals alike—is that the condition of childhood lead poisoning does not merit
the investment of often scarce resources the federal government allocates in several of
its public health and public insurance programs. This perception is reinforced by the
low prevalence of the disease, which today affects only approximately two percent of
children ages 1-5, and the current AAP guidelines, which recommend targeted blood
lead level testing for children at ages 12 and 24 months based on the results of a health
risk assessment indicating the potential for elevated blood lead levels.69
In contrast to the private sector, the detection and the treatment of childhood
lead poisoning is an important priority in the public sector. The Healthy People 2010
Objective 8-11 is to eliminate elevated blood lead levels in children. To this end, the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has developed a strategic plan
for the elimination of childhood lead poisoning, which includes an effort to build a
national surveillance system for monitoring children’s blood lead levels.70
CDC
recommends that states make public and private laboratories, including out-of-state
laboratories performing tests for residents of other states, the basis of their surveillance
system because, unlike oral disease, lead poisoning is usually a laboratory diagnosis that
does not require clinical judgment.
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According to CDC data, the majority of states (58 percent) require reporting of
blood lead levels in children (usually starting at birth), with two states mandating
reporting of all blood lead test results and 18 states requiring reporting of elevated blood
lead levels only.71 The majority of states with reporting requirements required reporting
from state laboratories (76 percent) and in-state private laboratories (83 percent); about
half of those states (49 percent) required reporting from both in-state and out-of-state
private laboratories.72 The majority of states with reporting requirements also required
reporting from physicians (79 percent).73
Following CDC’s lead, CMS has made the detection and treatment of childhood
lead poisoning a priority of the Medicaid program, which considers all children covered
by the program at risk and thus needing universal blood lead level testing. This policy
is in stark contrast with the AAP policy of performing a health risk assessment first
before a blood test is even considered. Lead toxicity screening services are covered
under EPSDT as part of the laboratory tests required under the program and must be
provided according to the federally-specified periodicity schedule of the CDC Advisory
Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention. A blood lead test must be
included. If a capillary specimen was used to perform the test and indicates elevated
blood lead levels, it must be confirmed by a venous blood sample. Follow-up medical
and public health services must also be provided.
In contrast to the Medicaid program, CMS has not made the detection and
treatment of childhood lead poisoning a priority of the SCHIP program. As was the
case for dental care, separate SCHIP programs have more flexibility to determine which
benefits they will cover, although they must provide benefits that are actuariallyequivalent to the basic services provided under a benchmark benefit package (e.g., state
employee benefit plan). Basic services explicitly include well-baby and well-child care,
but do not specify lead screening as a component of well-baby and well-child care.
We asked state Medicaid and SCHIP officials why they had set the lead
screening standards as they had in the contract. As was the case for dental care, the
most striking difference came from the fact that Medicaid programs, including SCHIP
Medicaid expansion programs, and separate SCHIP programs are governed by two
separate sets of rules.
Medicaid officials almost uniformly cited the federal ESPDT requirements as the
driving force for their lead screening standards. Because the EPSDT requirements
incorporate the CDC guidelines on the detection and treatment of lead poisoning in
Medicaid-covered children, which represent an expansion beyond the current industry
norm and professional practice in this area, officials from all but one state with
Medicaid programs and SCHIP Medicaid expansion programs or separate SCHIP
programs administered under the same contract as Medicaid believed that their
standards went beyond existing clinical guidelines.
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SCHIP officials representing the three separate SCHIP programs administered
under a separate contract from Medicaid again pointed to the flexibility of the SCHIP
statute and regulations, which do not set any federal standards in the area of lead
screening. As a result, they were free to depart from the EPSDT standards and all of
them did. In two states, the contract imposes a general requirement that, as part of
periodic health examinations, laboratory tests be performed according to the AAP
recommendations for preventive pediatric health care, which include a risk assessment
prior to testing. SCHIP officials representing one of these states explained that they had
elected the AAP standards pertaining to the well-child visit because, in their view, it was
the best way to tie in lead screening services without explicitly mentioning them. They
also believed that their choice reflected current industry practice. The SCHIP official
representing the second state recognized the lack of specificity of the contract language
and further noted that lead screening does not appear to be on the minds of the
commercial plans participating in the program. In the third state, the contract is
completely silent on the issue of laboratory tests, including blood lead level screens.
However, the SCHIP official representing this state stated that participating plans are
generally expected to follow the AAP standards and thus current industry practice.
We also asked state Medicaid and SCHIP officials how the pediatric lead
screening standards contained in their managed care contracts were arrived at and
negotiated with contractors.
States took three main approaches to contract
negotiation. Under the first approach, three states made pediatric lead screening
standards a nonnegotiable component of the HMO contract either because they were
predetermined by the EPSDT requirements at the federal level (two states) or because it
was included in the RFP as a minimum, nonnegotiable requirement (one state). Under
the second approach, four states, including all three separate SCHIP programs
administered under a managed care contract independent from Medicaid and one state
using a combined contractual document for its Medicaid and separate SCHIP programs,
did not have to negotiate this aspect of the contract because the contract did not
include any language specific to lead screening. Under the third approach, states (a
minority in this study) negotiated the standards in some fashion. One state, which
involves health plans at the RFP stage, used the RFP process to propose a set of
performance measures for well-child care and the plans counter-proposed with national
HEDIS measures instead. In the end, the state adopted a set of modified HEDIS
measures.
Finally, we asked states how important was the capacity to measure the
standard and what was the anticipated approach to performance measurement.
Similar to our findings on oral health, we found extreme variations in state approaches
to monitoring plan compliance with the pediatric lead screening standards of the
contract, although the majority of state programs expected participating plans to provide
some evidence of improvement in their performance (Table 2 in Appendix II). In
addition, about half of the states that were more advanced in their monitoring efforts
had also developed a closer collaboration with the public health agency in this area. At
the opposite end of the spectrum, the two states that did not monitor compliance at all
deferred all monitoring duties and responsibilities to the public health agency, which
was seen as being the lead monitoring agency in this area.
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3.

Summary of Findings on Selection of Standards

Overall, our findings show that states with Medicaid and separate SCHIP
programs faced different choices because of differing applicable federal law. For both
dental and lead screening services, states with Medicaid programs and SCHIP Medicaid
expansion programs or separate SCHIP programs administered by the Medicaid agency
(hereafter, Medicaid states) followed the EPSDT requirements to set their standards,
though, in the case of oral health, Medicaid states had a level of discretion in setting
their standards not available for lead screening. In contrast, states with separate SCHIP
programs had much greater flexibility in both areas.
The EPSDT standards on oral health essentially leave it up to states to select the
periodicity schedule plans and providers must follow in the provision of oral health
services, although they require states to consult with recognized medical and dental
organizations involved in children’s health care, which have not yet reached a
consensus on what the standard of care should be. Despite this lack of consensus in
the field, the majority of Medicaid states selected the AAP recommendations for
preventive pediatric health care (i.e., screen and refer at age 3)74 and believed that their
choice reflected existing practice and thus did not exceed industry customs and norms
in health care quality for children. Similarly, the majority of separate SCHIP plans chose
to require participating health plans to follow the AAP standards on dental referrals. In
at least two instances, states augmented the AAP guidelines with additional requirements
on health plans, providers, or both and believed their choice went a step further than
existing practice and thus attempted to raise the bar in health care quality for children.
The EPSDT standards on lead screening do not give states much flexibility in
setting their own standards. In addition, they already represent an advance beyond
existing professional and industry norms. As a result, the majority of Medicaid states
incorporated the EPSDT standards into their own standards and believed that they went
beyond existing norms. However, in what is perhaps indicative of what is to come as
CDC and CMS are contemplating a possible change in lead screening policy, one
Medicaid state, noting the current disagreement among CMS regional offices on the
benefits of universal testing due to the very low prevalence of childhood lead poisoning
in certain areas of the country, opted for a policy of targeted screening (which is
reflected in the contract by a reference to current preventive guidelines), similar to that
advocated by the industry, against current Medicaid policy, but with the understanding
of its regional office. In contrast to the majority of Medicaid states but in step with the
Medicaid state just described, all separate SCHIP programs selected the AAP standards
on well-baby and well-child visits as a way to tie in lead screening services without
having to explicitly mention them.
Taken together, these findings suggest that, unless the federal government
specifies the content of coverage and the periodicity with which it should be furnished,
states will be more likely to follow professional and industry practice and forego
attempts to raise the bar in health care quality for children. They further suggest that the
federal government will be more likely to specify the content of coverage and the
periodicity with which it should be furnished in the case of low prevalence conditions
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See previous footnote about the change in AAP policy.
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that are attached to public health concerns. If those federal specifications reflect an
advance beyond current norms, as one can expect in the case of low prevalence
conditions, states may run into serious implementation problems.
Our interviews indicate that it may be the case with childhood lead poisoning.
Several states described a situation where plans and providers are uniformly opposed to
universal screening and instead, favor targeted screening. In some states, the very low
prevalence of the condition further reinforces the perception among medical directors
and pediatricians that universal screening is a waste of resources. Except for one state,
which decided against compliance with federal policy so that it could redirect its limited
resources to addressing more pressing needs, states find themselves in a bind in trying
to meet federal requirements. They either deal directly with provider resistance, as
several states have done, investing resources in educating providers about the
importance of universal screening (when changing provider behavior is known to be an
extremely difficult task and when these resources could be put to other uses), or they
do not do so directly but rather indirectly, relying solely on their monitoring and
enforcement plan as a means to redress pervasive provider noncompliance (with the
limitations of such an approach in addressing the root causes of the problem).
b.

The Implementation of Medicaid and SCHIP Managed Care Monitoring and
Enforcement Activities

In this section, we describe and compare state approaches to monitoring and
enforcement of pediatric standards, by degree of managed care penetration (i.e., high
vs. medium vs. low penetration), type of program design (i.e., Medicaid-administered
program vs. separately-administered SCHIP plan), and prevalence of the condition
targeted by the contractual performance standard (i.e., high vs. low prevalence
condition).
1.
State Approaches to Monitoring and Enforcement of Pediatric Standards by Degree
of Managed Care
Penetration
The nine participating states were categorized according to the level of managed
care penetration in the general population. They were then divided into the following
three groups for the purpose of analyzing interview responses: (1) states with high levels
of managed care penetration, i.e., states with more than 20 percent of the general
population enrolled in managed care (seven states); (2) states with medium levels of
managed care penetration, i.e., states with 10 to 19.9 percent of the general population
enrolled in managed care (one state); and (3) states with low levels of managed care
penetration, i.e. states with less than 10 percent of the general population enrolled in
managed care (one state). Because of the small sample size, our findings have to be
interpreted with extreme caution. Nevertheless, we found that the level of MCO
participation and competition in the state in general and in the Medicaid and SCHIP
markets in particular appeared to matter. In the state with only one contractor, officials
felt that pushing it too hard on compliance would result in the MCO pulling out. Table
3 in Appendix II describes each grouping in more detail, including the level of Medicaid
and SCHIP managed care enrollment in the study states.
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•

Formal monitoring and enforcement plan with clear goals, assignments,
measurements, and milestones

Under Medicaid, states are required to ensure that managed care organizations
comply with federally-specified EPSDT and managed care requirements and standards
established by the state in the area of quality assessment and performance improvement
through regular monitoring and evaluation of their contract provisions, which by law
they must establish when they buy managed care products. Under SCHIP, states that
buy managed care products must also do so through contracts that adhere to federal
and state contract and procurement requirements but they are not bound by similar
requirements regarding coverage of benefits, managed care, and oversight of the quality
of care furnished (although the option to follow Medicaid requirements is available).
In order to assess states’ monitoring efforts, we asked whether they had a formal,
written monitoring and enforcement plan for the provision of pediatric standards spelled
out in their contracts, and if so, what its main goals were. We also asked them whether
they had clearly stated their policy objectives regarding the monitoring and enforcement
of the pediatric oral health and blood lead level screening standards included in their
contracts, whether they had set up an agency responsible for implementing and
enforcing these policy objectives, and whether there was multi-faceted support within
the agency and among policy beneficiaries toward these objectives.
All states had a formal, written general monitoring and enforcement plan. All
states responded that they had folded their general monitoring and enforcement plan
into their contract, and that its general goal was to ensure access to quality care. Five
states referenced federal Medicaid policy and state statutes, regulations, and policy
manuals as additional documents embodying their monitoring and enforcement plan.
Four states had also developed a separate, comprehensive quality improvement plan
independent of the contract, and, of those, two had developed a dental quality
improvement plan in addition to their comprehensive quality improvement plan. State
officials explained that specific policy objectives regarding oral health and lead
screening could be found in the same documents. The majority of respondents stated
that they expected oral health services to be provided in accordance with the EPSDT
requirements and AAP recommendations, and lead screening services in accordance
with the EPSDT requirements and state laws. They also believed that they had clearly
communicated these expectations, both orally and in writing.
Low levels of managed care penetration seemed to be a factor in explaining
whether states had specified precise standards for measuring compliance with
quality improvement goals in the areas of dental care and lead screening. While the
degree of managed care penetration did not seem to be a factor in explaining whether
states had a formal, written monitoring plan, it appeared to have some bearing on the
extent to which states had specified precise standards for measuring compliance with
their policy goals related to oral health and lead screening. In contrast to states with
high and medium levels of managed care penetration, the majority of which had
established clinical performance measures specific to well-child care (oftentimes
replicating the federal requirement of a participation of 80 percent in the EPSDT visit),
and in several cases specific to dental care and lead screening services, the one state
with low levels of managed care penetration had not established any clinical
performance measures. Because there is so little managed care in that state, program
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officials explained, the program does not focus on quality improvement but on ensuring
access to care instead. To that end, the program uses a quantifiable access standard,
whereby plans must demonstrate that 90 percent of their enrolled children have access
to a pediatrician within 10 miles. Although unique in the group of states studied, this
state exemplifies the need for an underlying managed care market if states want to be
successful in using managed care and quality improvement techniques in their public
insurance programs.
All states had set up an agency for implementing and enforcing the policy
objectives related to oral health and lead screening. Although all states had set up an
agency for implementing and enforcing the policy objectives related to oral health and
lead screening, in some states the responsibilities specifically linked to the oversight of
managed care, dental carve-outs, and lead screening seemed to add layers of
complexity to state program administration. It is not known whether states had plans
outlining the lead agency’s monitoring activities, key partners and stakeholders, and
roles and responsibilities, but we found that states adopted differing approaches to
program organization when setting up an agency for implementing and enforcing the
policy objectives related to oral health and lead screening. Six states made the Medicaid
agency the lead agency for setting contractual standards and the Medicaid managed
care division the lead division for monitoring compliance with those standards. Two of
those states also had a dental carve-out (one run under a fee-for-service system and the
other under a managed care system) and had assigned oversight responsibilities
specifically related to the provision of dental services to a division specializing in dental
care (although the Medicaid managed care division retained oversight responsibility for
the dental component of the EPSDT well-child visit). These two states also shared with
the department of health or even had relinquished to the department of health
significant oversight responsibility for lead screening services.
The seventh state integrated all Medicaid and SCHIP operations into one
overarching agency and made that agency the lead oversight agency. The eighth state
combined the Medicaid agency, the SCHIP agency, and the public health agency into
one department. In the case of Medicaid, oversight over oral health and lead screening
contractual duties were assigned to the Medicaid agency, and community awareness
duties regarding lead screening to the public health agency. In the case of SCHIP,
oversight duties were shared between the SCHIP agency (oral health) and the public
health agency (lead screening).
The last two states, which happen to be separate SCHIP states, one located in a
heavy managed care market and the other in an almost nonexistent managed care
market, have their programs jointly administered by an independent health insurance
board, which is responsible for setting standards for the program, and another entity. In
the first state, this entity was the department of managed care, which was responsible
for regulating all aspects of managed care operations and being the enforcer of state
law. In the second state, the entity was the Medicaid agency, which was responsible for
reporting and overall management of the program.
The level of support for the policy objectives regarding the monitoring and
enforcement of oral health and lead screening varied across states, and the low
degree of managed care penetration appeared to be a factor in one state. Three
state programs enjoyed multi-faceted support toward their objectives on oral health and
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lead screening. Personnel responsible for implementing the policy were committed to
promoting the objectives, and they enjoyed the support of their superiors in doing so.
Health plans cohesively supported implementation of the policy. In two additional state
programs, interviewees described a general commitment from all sides to implementing
important policies, particularly as they related to lead in the first state and to oral health
in the second state, even though health plans appeared to raise issues around the lack
of adequate resources for them to reach the stated objectives.
State and plan commitment to lead and oral health policy objectives seemed to
rest heavily on a belief in the utility of such efforts. In one state, while the
administration remained committed to promoting oral health and lead screening
objectives, health plans and providers, while supportive of the oral health objectives,
objected to the lead screening objectives because of the controversial issue of universal
testing. In another state, while the administration was highly aware of the lead
screening objectives but not very conscious of the oral health objectives, health plans
and providers uniformly rejected the lead screening objectives and did not even focus
on the oral health objectives.
In the one state with low levels of managed care penetration, program
representatives explained that, while the state administration and the health plan were
committed to promoting the oral health and lead screening goals, the health plan’s loose
managed care structure was not conducive to cohesiveness on the part of the providers
and this lack of control over providers prevented the health plan from implementing
strategies to reach those goals.
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•

Prevention Strategies

In our effort to assess the effectiveness of states’ monitoring efforts, we also
examined state strategies to prevent implementation problems, with a special emphasis
on states’ contract specifications in the following areas:
•
•
•
•

service components and service periodicity schedule;
adequacy of provider network, travel distances, and waiting times to provide the
service according to the periodicity schedule;
adequacy of medical care provided through the use of service specific utilization
statistics, encounter data, clinical studies, and medical record audits; and
adequacy of beneficiary satisfaction through the use of service specific
satisfaction surveys and grievance reports.

We found that contractual specifications varied greatly across study states, a
variation that did not seem related to the degree of managed care penetration in the
state.
Specification of service components and periodicity schedule for dental care
and lead screening services. State programs more often listed the service components
of dental care and used the state’s own periodicity schedule or referred to some
professional organization’s periodicity schedule for the provision of dental care. In
contrast, they more often included a broad requirement to provide EPSDT or laboratory
tests, or omitted altogether a requirement to provide lead screening services, and
followed the EPSDT schedule or lacked specificity regarding the periodicity schedule for
the provision of lead screening services.
Specification of minimum provider network requirements, waiting times,
and travel distances. In general, state programs were more likely to omit specifications
on one, two, or all three aspects of access to care (provider networks, waiting times, and
travel distances) than to include provisions on all three aspects of access to care. Four
state programs, including the separate SCHIP programs, lacked specificity on all three
aspects of access to care; three programs lacked specificity on two of three aspects; and
two programs lacked specificity on one of three. Only two state programs had
specifications on all three aspects of access to care. In the area of dental care, they
were as likely to specify minimums that were specific to the provision of dental services
(e.g., network must include dentists who should be located within the specified travel
distances and should see patients within the specified waiting times) as they were to
specify general requirements for the adequacy of the provider network, waiting times
and travel distances. In the area of lead screening services, on the other hand, they
were much less likely to tailor their minimum requirements to the provision of lead
screening services and more likely to impose general minima.
Specification of data requirements to monitor adequacy of medical care and
beneficiary satisfaction. All but one state program included some data reporting
requirements in their contracts. Only two state programs required managed care
organizations to provide all sources of data, i.e., utilization statistics, encounter data,
clinical studies, medical record audits, satisfaction surveys, and grievance reports. The
remaining states required managed care organizations to provide one or more of these
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sources of data, but in the aggregate each source of data was required in similar
frequency. Additionally, except for two state programs (one contract specifically
required utilization statistics and encounter data on dental services, while another
contract specifically required clinical studies on lead screening services), requirements
were not tailored to dental care and lead screening.
•

Coordination Strategies

A third key component of a state monitoring plan consists of coordination
among the various agencies responsible for achieving the policy objectives regarding
oral health and lead screening. Do the Medicaid and SCHIP agencies and the various
other agencies responsible for monitoring and enforcement (e.g., Attorney General’s
office, department of insurance) administratively coordinate their efforts? How do they
coordinate their efforts? Do they share information and communicate on a regular
basis? Again, we found great variation in the level of coordination across states, which
did not appear related to the degree of managed care penetration in the state. Most
states pursued strategies to coordinate their monitoring and enforcement efforts with
other relevant agencies, such as allowing access to data on request (one state), being
notified and notifying the appropriate agency when appeals indicate a potential problem
(five states), disseminating or making available the results of internal audits to interested
parties (four states), referring cases to the appropriate agency if monitoring reports show
that they fall under some other entity’s jurisdiction (one state), setting up regular
channels of communication and information sharing, e.g., interagency meetings (one
state).
Coordination with the Attorney General’s office. Generally speaking, state
programs did not appear to have close relationships with the Attorney General’s office,
which was perceived as having narrow responsibilities in the area of criminal activity
(i.e., fraud and abuse) and thus as having little involvement in issues of quality of care,
especially as it related to dental care and lead screening services. One state official also
explained that the program currently lacked funding, staff, and need to pursue
coordination efforts with the Attorney General’s office. A few states described a more
ongoing relationship between the two agencies, and of those, only one state had
established a formal relationship with the other agency. Three state programs had no
formal coordination with the Attorney General’s office but did refer cases of fraud (e.g.,
enrollment fraud) detected through their own monitoring efforts. In addition, one of
these programs held annual meetings with the Attorney General’s fraud control unit
staff, who come to the agency to make presentations to participating health plans. One
state program had an interagency agreement with the Attorney General’s office
pertaining to cases of fraud.
Coordination with the department of insurance. Most state programs had
some relationship with the department of insurance, which was chiefly responsible for
issues of financial solvency. Several states described a close working relationship with
the department. Working relationships with the department of insurance ranged from
information sharing and regular communication to standing monthly or quarterly
meetings to referrals of cases when warranted and permitted under state law. Other
states described a more episodic kind of a relationship with the department, with no
formal process in place. One state limited contact with the department to those cases
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where there was a violation of insurance license or financial requirement; another to
fraud and abuse issues. A third group of states had no relationship at all with the
department, although they reported that they cooperated when necessary.
Coordination with the department of health.
Coordination with the
department of health was often cited as necessary needed in the area of lead screening
oversight since it is a public health reportable condition, although there were gradients
in the level of coordination across states. For example, we found that:
• one state shares a database on lead screening with the department;
• one state has a data sharing agreement with the department of health;
• one state has access to the department’s surveillance data and does its own
geographic analyses, and in addition, a nurse from the Medicaid managed
care division is involved in the department’s lead screening group;
• one state allows the department to access its Medicaid data on request;
• one state has regular communication and meetings with the department on
lead screening issues and each agency’s specific area of responsibility;
• one state has a close relationship with the department on the development of
lead screening incentives;
• one state communicates with the public health agency on a regular basis
through formal and informal meetings, which is facilitated by the fact that the
two agencies are housed in the same department;
• one state (separate SCHIP program) is currently discussing future coordination
efforts with the lead screening branch; and two states (separate SCHIP
programs) have no formal collaboration with the department (though one
program does collaborate on immunizations and quality improvement).
Much less often did states pursue coordination efforts with the department of
health on oral health, with only two states mentioning that they also worked with the
department on oral health issues (in addition to lead screening issues). Finally, two
states also interacted with the department through formal and informal mechanisms on
complaints and grievances.
Coordination between SCHIP and Medicaid agencies. All three separate
SCHIP programs talked about their coordination efforts with the much larger and more
experienced Medicaid programs. One state program works closely with Medicaid on
quality monitoring and enforcement. The second state program works closely with
Medicaid generally (“they share information on a regular basis and sit with them daily”)
and is currently holding regular meetings on encounter data where they are discussing
the possibility of “piggy-backing” SCHIP’s future data collection efforts on Medicaid
current efforts. The third state program said that the two agencies have a close
relationship and try to set common standards and share information on those.
•

Detection Strategies

A fourth key component of a state monitoring plan consists of detection
strategies or the creation of a mechanism to monitor compliance. What kind of
mechanisms did the Medicaid and SCHIP agencies put in place to monitor the provision
of dental care and lead screening services? Do they use quantifiable performance
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standards and what types of information do they collect to verify plan compliance with
the standards? The degree of managed care penetration did not seem to influence
whether states had put in place mechanisms for monitoring compliance but, as stated
previously, it seemed to influence whether states used quality performance indicators to
measure compliance.
All states had created a mechanism for monitoring compliance, which was
not specific to monitoring the provision of dental care and lead screening services
but rather was applicable to the monitoring of plan performance in general. All
states relied heavily on data collected at regular intervals (monthly, quarterly, annually)
as a mechanism to monitor compliance. Specific sources of data included: comparative
data analyses (e.g., EPSDT reports, HEDIS measures); routine reviews of specific
problem areas (e.g., EPSDT, lead, dental, provider network); periodic site visits (e.g.,
operational and financial reviews, which can include a review of lead screening and
dental care services); focused clinical studies/medical audits/medical record reviews
(e.g., provision of dental, lead screening services); annual performance reviews/internal
audits of performance; review of plan policies and procedures; regulatory reviews;
review of plan-conducted quality improvement projects (e.g., dental care); satisfaction
surveys; and use of oral feedback. One state also mentioned the department of health’s
lead screening data warehouse as an important source of data for monitoring plan
compliance with lead screening requirements.
In addition, states usually relied on grievances and complaint calls as a source of
data for monitoring compliance and also used them as an early warning system for
detecting potential problems of substandard performance requiring follow-up on the
part of the state. However, states explained, grievances and complaint calls rarely deal
with denial of services, or if they do, they do not deal with preventive care services,
such as oral health and lead screening, but rather with specialty care services.
Except for one state with a separate SCHIP program, where all of the analyses
and investigations were plan-conducted, analyses of the various sources of data just
described were performed by the state and/or an external organization and the plans,
more often with than without outside validation.
As stated above, the degree of managed care penetration seemed to have
some effect on the extent to which states had specified quantifiable quality
standards for measuring compliance with their policy goals related to oral health
and lead screening. In contrast to states with high and medium levels of managed care
penetration, the majority of which had established clinical performance measures
specific to well-child care (oftentimes replicating the federal requirement of a
participation of 80 percent of enrolled children in the EPSDT visit), and in several cases
specific to dental care and lead screening services, the one state with low levels of
managed care penetration had not established any clinical performance measures.
Because there is so little managed care in that state, program officials explained, the
program does not focus on quality improvement but on ensuring access to care instead.
To that end, the program uses a quantifiable access standard, instead of quality
performance indicators.
•

Enforcement Strategies
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The fifth key component to a state monitoring plan consists of enforcement
strategies. What is the state’s general approach to enforcement? What kinds of penalty
and incentive systems favor compliance? Are there any barriers in enforcing contract
provisions related to lead screening and oral health?
All states characterized their general approach to enforcement as ongoing.
The majority of states also characterized their general approach to enforcement as
proactive and systematic in addition to ongoing. A few states added that in some
aspects it is also reactive and periodic, citing complaints and grievances as a monitoring
mechanism to which they react whenever providers and beneficiaries use it.
While several states with high levels of managed care penetration were
uncomfortable with the term “enforcement,” which invoked punishment, and
preferred the terms “common quality improvement effort with plans,”
collaboration with plans, or partnership with plans, states with medium and low
levels of managed care penetration related a real need to minimize their
enforcement efforts if they wanted to keep plans in their programs. Even though
monitoring and enforcement takes on a more collaborative tone in states with higher
levels of managed care penetration because of external factors such as major access
problems (e.g., undersupply of pediatric dentists), this was particularly true for states
with lower levels of managed care penetration. In the state with medium levels of
managed care penetration, the program witnessed a significant drop in the number of
contracts signed with managed care organizations over a ten year period. Program
officials attributed this drop to underlying systemic factors, such as provider shortages
and low Medicaid reimbursement rates, which make it difficult for plans to attract
providers willing to serve publicly-insured children. Under these circumstances,
program representatives explained, it is difficult to “come down on HMOs,” even though
the contractual mechanisms exist to sanction them.
These circumstances also
encouraged the state to focus limited resources on “getting kids in” for care rather than
“doing detailed analysis.” Program officials use the rate of EPSDT well-child visits as a
starting point to determine whether children receive dental services and they do not
enforce the lead component of EPSDT not only because they feel that they would
duplicate the extensive work of the department of health in this area and thus waste
precious resources but also because they feel that they would not be the appropriate
oversight agency in view of the department of health’s jurisdiction over the entire state
population.
State officials in the state with low levels of managed care penetration explained
that, because there is so little managed care in general, there is also little enforcement
other than in the case of criminal acts (e.g., fraud and abuse) or complaints. They
stressed that they would lose their sole contractor if they started strict enforcement of
plan performance. Instead, they work very closely with the contractor in order to retain
its services.
The majority of states had specified sanctions in their contracts, and several
states devised a graduated incentive and penalty system to encourage plan
compliance but the actual use of sanctions varied across states. All but two state
programs specified sanctions for plan noncompliance in their contracts, and in many
cases also specified the basis for imposing each type of sanction. The number of
contractually specified sanctions went from a low of one (i.e., termination, the ultimate
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sanction) to a high of nine sanctions specified. Only four state programs tied sanctions
to quality violations: liquidated damages in one state; corrective action plans in two
states (one of which also tied sanctions to nonperformance on EPSDT, lead screening,
and oral health services and termination to quality violations); and withholding of
capitation in the fourth state.
At least five states developed a graduated incentive and penalty system. In all
cases, states began with a corrective action plan, which is often, but not only, used to
address quality violations, and then advanced to sanctions, when plans demonstrate
sustained nonperformance.
For example, in one state, sanctions start with the
suspension of enrollment, followed by financial penalties, and end with termination. In
another state, sanctions start with refundable fines, followed by nonrefundable fines,
then by enrollment freezes, and end with termination.
States that have had to advance from corrective action plans to sanctions have
found that this progression is the most effective way to ensure compliance. Overall,
they have also found that the use of financial incentives rather than financial penalties
works best. As one state official put it, “the carrot works as well as the stick, if not
better.” For example, one state gives plans additional dollars for each additional lead
screen or uses withholds to encourage plans to meet the lead screening standards.
Another state is currently considering using the HEDIS scores to determine default
enrollment algorithms as an incentive to improve quality. Several states underscored
that nonfinancial incentives, such as information sharing on the web and public
reporting of unblinded information across plans, were also quite effective.
The actual use of incentives and penalties varied across states. Of those states
with a graduated system, the majority did not have to go beyond the corrective action
plan. However, at least two states have used the sanctions available to them beyond the
corrective action plan, and one state used all of them but termination (although it did
recommend it in one instance). Three states stated they never had to use sanctions,
including the one state with medium levels of managed care penetration. This particular
state explained it is difficult to sanction plans for systemic factors that are beyond the
plans’ control (as the state official put it, “it is hard to enforce the contract when there is
nobody to do the service”).
The majority of states did not report any barriers in enforcing the language
of their contracts, although they did report significant challenges in both the area
of oral health and lead screening related to the underlying health care system.
States reported barriers and challenges not so much related to the language used in their
contracts, though in two instances it did come up as an issue, but rather related to
underlying systemic issues. As one state official put it, while there was an impetus for
improving the contractual language on well-child care, especially lead screening, the
contract was not seen as all encompassing on quality improvement because other work
at the community level ultimately made a difference. The state official also noted that
Medicaid, despite its reliance on contracts and payments, is not as effective as
community standards to change medical practice. Or, as another state official put it,
“we codify what we would like to see happen but have to deal with the reality of the
delivery system.”
Special challenges related to the provision of dental services included:
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•
•
•
•

•
•
•

access problems in rural areas;
manpower and supply issues, such as the lack of dentists in general and the
lack of dentists accepting Medicaid patients;
low reimbursement rates;
lack of awareness on the importance of oral health both among providers
and beneficiaries (which prompted one state to increase attention to the issue
by sending reminders to providers to do oral screens and stuffers to
beneficiaries reminding them about the services to which they are entitled);
the current practice of providers to bill for EPSDT in general, not specific oral
components, which makes monitoring of dental care difficult, especially with
encounter data;
disagreement among professional organizations on the appropriate periodicity
schedule; and
lack of training (which prompted one state to develop a training program on
pediatric dental care for both dentists and physicians, who are trained by
dentists).

Special challenges related to the provision of lead screening services
included:
• resistance to universal testing reinforced by the low prevalence of childhood
lead poisoning and the perception that is it wrong to invest in this;
• poor reporting, poor data, lack of uniform measurement, lack of national
protocols for collecting consistent information across plans and measuring
performance across plans;
• lack of provider education (e.g., physicians do not do blood work in their
offices, are not aware of other less common sources of exposure, are
unaware of the differences between Medicaid policy and AAP
recommendations); and
• reimbursement issues, including low provider reimbursement rates, unfunded
mandates imposed on plans, reimbursement only for venipuncture not for
capillary specimens.
•

Reporting strategies

The sixth and final component of a state monitoring plan consists of reporting
strategies to the federal government, which is a key actor in the implementation of
Medicaid and SCHIP policy due to the federalist nature of the two programs.
The majority of states described an ongoing relationship with the federal
government but the degree of involvement on the part of the federal government
varied by state. Two states said the federal government was very involved in their
programs in general. A third state stated that the federal government had an acute
interest in its EPSDT program, especially in the area of lead screening. A fourth state
described the federal government as an active purchaser articulating policy, not so
much an active participant at the state level on behalf of children protected by Medicaid
and SCHIP policy.
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One separate SCHIP program described the federal government more as a silent
partner, explaining that the well-child visit regulations were the only active involvement
on the part of the federal government. In contrast, another separate SCHIP program
said that the federal government was highly involved, at least in the beginning of the
program, by exercising oversight over dental care because manpower and the ability to
meet the needs of SCHIP children were significant issues for the state.
Although states can report back to the CMS and the Office of Inspector
General for additional sanctions beyond the purview of the state, none had used
this option. At least one state program explained that the contract reiterates some
federal requirements that give CMS or the Office of Inspector General authority to
impose sanctions, for example in the case of violations of the Civil Rights Act, and
debarment of providers. However, states uniformly said they never had to use this
option.
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2.
State Approaches to Monitoring and Enforcement of Pediatric Standards by Type of
Program Design
As part of our study, we reviewed our discussions with state Medicaid and SCHIP
agency representatives for differences and similarities in their approach to monitoring
and enforcing their managed care contracts, particularly as it pertains to oral health and
lead screening. We categorized our nine states according to program design and
divided them into the following three groups for the purpose of analyzing interview
responses: (1) states with Medicaid programs and SCHIP Medicaid expansion programs
(two states); (2) states with Medicaid programs and separate SCHIP programs which use
the same contractual document for both programs (four states); and (3) states with
Medicaid programs and separate SCHIP programs which use separate contractual
documents for each program (three states). Table 4 in Appendix II describes the federal
requirements that apply to each grouping in more detail. Because officials representing
states in the second group of states affirmed that SCHIP children were entitled to the
same services as Medicaid children and managed care organizations were held to the
same data collection and reporting obligations for both populations, we refer to the first
and second group of states jointly as Medicaid states, unless specifically noted
otherwise in this section.
SCHIP agencies’ monitoring and enforcement plans tend to focus more on
oral health than lead screening, whereas Medicaid agencies’ plans focus more on
lead screening than oral health. The differences in approaches to adopting,
monitoring, and enforcing contractual provisions vis-à-vis lead screening and oral health
are rooted chiefly within the respective federal and state laws and regulations that
control the duties of the Medicaid and SCHIP agencies when contracting with managed
care organizations.
Medicaid agencies operate within a more tightly regulated structure than their
SCHIP counterparts. For instance, dental and lead screening services are federally
required under EPSDT, and Medicaid programs must monitor the provision of these
services. In addition, Medicaid law spells out a periodicity schedule for lead screening
services in much more detail than it does for dental care services. SCHIP programs, on
the other hand, have more flexibility in terms of the benefits they must provide and their
responsibilities in measuring plan performance. Federal law only requires SCHIP
programs to provide well-baby and well-child care services, and does not specifically
list dental care and lead screening as a component of either. In neither case does it
spell out a periodicity schedule. In addition, it does not impose any monitoring
requirements similar to Medicaid.
For those states interviewed, all Medicaid and SCHIP contracts include or
reference a formal, written plan for monitoring and enforcing the provision of pediatric
services by managed care organizations. Most Medicaid contracts referred managed
care organizations to pertinent policy guides, administrative rules and federal and state
laws and regulations. A few Medicaid programs and one SCHIP program included a
more detailed roadmap for monitoring plans in additional materials referenced by the
contract, such as a quality improvement plan and provider manuals, which functioned
as guidelines for monitoring the lead and dental provisions outlined in the contract.
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The degree of specificity of contractual provisions for lead screening and
dental care varied by contract, with no noticeable difference between Medicaid and
SCHIP contracts other than references to EPSDT in Medicaid contracts which did
not appear in SCHIP contracts. Medicaid agencies relied on EPSDT services to ensure
the provision of lead screening and testing to their beneficiaries. In many cases,
contracts simply referred to federal and state EPSDT standards. In contrast, Medicaid
agencies were a little more specific in their contracts on the service components of oral
health and the intervals with which they should be provided under EPSDT. Though
physicians were required to perform an oral screen, most contracts did not more
specifically denote what this screen should include. One Medicaid state “beefed up”
such language by requiring doctors to “look at teeth” and also instituted training
programs aimed at educating physicians and dentists in pediatric dental care. A second
Medicaid program added requirements to ensure open access to dental care and had
begun a statewide effort to educate families on their rights to seek such care.
Because there are no EPSDT-like mandates contained in federal law for the
provision of well-child care services under SCHIP and because, one state official said,
SCHIP children “look” more like private sector children and less like Medicaid children,
health plan obligations regarding lead and dental services are less circumscribed in
SCHIP contracts. SCHIP contract provisions were more specific regarding expectations
for oral health but noticeably broader on the issue of lead screening. All three contracts
listed specific service components of dental care whereas, for lead, two contracts
included a broad requirement to provide laboratory tests and one contract omitted a
requirement altogether. All three contracts required plans to follow the AAP guidelines
for laboratory tests (two contracts) and oral health (one contract); one contract referred
to the AAPD guidelines for oral health; and two contracts lacked specificity regarding
the periodicity schedule for lead screening (one contract) and oral health (one contract).
There was not a significant difference between SCHIP and Medicaid in terms
of interagency coordination with the state Attorney General’s office and the
department of insurance, but some differences were detected in their relationship
with the department of health, particularly in the area of lead screening.
Responsibilities and duties of the respective agencies seemed to be well laid out
because the Attorney General’s office and the department of insurance have very
specific oversight authority over public health insurance programs on matters of fraud
and abuse, and financial and other regulation, respectively. All agencies also had some
type of process in place by which matters of concern were referred to the appropriate
party.
Almost all of the Medicaid programs relied on some degree of coordination and
communication with the department of health in regards to blood lead levels and high
prevalence areas as well as lead abatement due to the department’s surveillance
activities in the area of childhood lead poisoning. Many of the Medicaid agency
representatives expressed opposition to what they perceived as overly strict lead
screening requirements imposed by the federal government. Many states felt that lead
screening efforts were too broad and financially wasteful, and that more targeted
screening efforts would be a more efficient use of limited funds.
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In contrast, none of the SCHIP programs had a formal collaboration mechanism
in place with the department of health, although one program had started discussions
about future coordination efforts. One SCHIP representative noted that the SCHIP
agency considered the issue more under the purview of department of health, and that
when, issues of follow-up on high lead screening levels was necessary, the department
of health worked directly with the state’s only insurer and not with the SCHIP agency.
SCHIP agencies also reported that they worked closely with their Medicaid counterparts.
Typically, an agency’s ability to monitor the execution of contractual
obligations relied heavily on data, but Medicaid agencies were generally more
advanced than SCHIP agencies in this area due to differences in federal
requirements and in program longevity. Medicaid agencies are legally required to
collect certain types of data about their beneficiaries enrolled in managed care,
including encounter and performance data, and data used evaluate the quality of
services provided as well as beneficiary access to care. Managed care organizations
participating in Medicaid programs are obligated to collect this data and report them to
the state Medicaid agency as specified in their contracts. All Medicaid states and states
using Medicaid contracts for both their SCHIP and Medicaid populations collected
federally mandated encounter data and EPSDT data (Form 416). Several Medicaid
program representatives noted that, although physicians are obligated to perform EPSDT
services during well-child visits, it is difficult to unbundle EPSDT data to determine
performance levels for oral health screens because they do not bill for those services
separately. Additional sources of data, such as federally-required focused clinical
studies, annual site visits, and other reports (e.g., complaints and grievances) helped
agencies monitor health plan performance in regards to lead screening and oral health.
SCHIP programs, on the other hand, are not required to collect encounter data
nor are they bound by EPSDT reporting requirements. In general, their contractual
requirements and data collection techniques were not as evolved as their Medicaid
counterparts. Most lacked dependable if any encounter data. State efforts to measure
services provided to their SCHIP population tended to be more exploratory at this point,
with the agencies struggling to find ways to measure and improve plan quality and
performance, particularly for oral health, among other health issues. One agency
representative noted that because their SCHIP program is relatively new, they were still
in the process of “getting to know” the SCHIP population before determining contractual
data reporting requirements. Another SCHIP agency reported that they relied on HEDIS
reports and satisfaction surveys to monitor plans as they did not have the budget to
include encounter data. Two states had not yet developed quantifiable standards for
measuring oral health and lead screening quality; one of these relied solely on an
access standard, which detects if children have access to a pediatrician. The third
agency had developed a dental performance standard but not a lead performance
standard. It had not yet developed a performance threshold for the dental standard, but
had begun collecting data in order to “see what was happening out there.”
Many Medicaid and SCHIP agencies also used HEDIS performance standards to
monitor and enforce contract provisions and quality standards. HEDIS is limited,
however, in that, while the National Medicaid HEDIS Database Project provides
standardized performance information for managed Medicaid health plans to assist
them in their evaluation of the quality of care provided to beneficiaries, including a
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category for “annual dental visits,” there are no formal national protocols in place for
collecting information across plans specific to lead screening or testing. A few Medicaid
states were piloting a HEDIS-like measure for lead screening.
SCHIP and Medicaid agencies did not exhibit significant differences in their
enforcement strategies. The majority of those interviewed viewed the state’s general
approach to monitoring and enforcement of contractual obligations as ongoing,
proactive, and systematic, as well as reactive at times. Penalties and incentives were
documented in the contracts and states believed that they had the appropriate tools to
enforce their contracts. The crosscutting concern expressed by all interviewees was the
need to provide and monitor services under increasingly tight budgets. As federal and
state budgets continue to shrink, states are faced with myriad challenges on how best to
provide necessary services without financially overextending themselves.
One
interviewee from a low reimbursement state noted that budgetary constraints in some
ways compelled states to try to form more cooperative relationships with managed care
organizations. Other factors, such as the scarcity of health plans willing to serve
Medicaid and SCHIP populations, the lack of dentists, and other underlying systemic
problems, encouraged both Medicaid and SCHIP agencies to form patterns of two-way
interaction and cooperation with participating plans, rather than top-down or heavy
handed approaches.
Although contractual language generally gave agencies the ability to penalize,
financially or otherwise, managed care organizations that did not meet certain
performance, quality, or other contractual standards, the majority of states expressed
reticence in using these measures, generally preferring the carrot to the stick. None of
the three SCHIP programs had ever used the sanctions available to them, mostly
because of the newness of the programs. But other reasons were invoked as well, such
as the upfront selection process of plans as a guarantee for plans to be good business
partners in one state, and the low level of managed care penetration in another state.
The direct involvement of the federal government varied across states, but
several Medicaid agencies perceived the federal government as more involved in
oversight than SCHIP agencies did. Several Medicaid and combination program
interviewees viewed the federal government’s role in lead screening and oral health as
setting the standards by which the agencies designed their programs. The federal
government, they noted, was particularly active in the area of lead screening oversight.
SCHIP agencies, on the other hand, were given a lot more latitude in designing
programs. One agency viewed the federal government more as a silent partner rather
than an active participant; another agency noted that the federal government had been
very involved, at least in the beginning of the program, in the area of oral health. This
difference in federal involvement is most likely an inherent function of SCHIP program
design and its size compared to Medicaid.
3.
State Approaches to Monitoring and Enforcement of Pediatric Standards by
Prevalence of the Condition
Targeted by the Contractual Performance Standard
The assumption driving much of this research was that states would design more
elaborate monitoring and enforcement plans of pediatric standards relating to low
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prevalence conditions, presumably because these standards represent a level of care
that goes beyond what contractors would already furnish as a matter of industry
practice and, as such, require greater specificity in the contract language. Our
assumption did not hold in the case of the nine study states and oral health and lead
screening services; other important factors, such as program requirements and
prevalence of the condition in the state, appeared to dictate states’ approaches to
monitoring the standards.
Contract specifications were not more detailed for lead screening services
than for dental care services. In fact, our review of contract requirements indicates
that contracts were more likely to be vague or silent on the components of lead
screening services and the periodicity with which they should be furnished, less likely to
tailor minimum provider network requirements, waiting times, and travel distances to the
provision of lead screening services, and as likely to require data specific to lead
screening services (which, in both cases, was a rare occurrence).
The majority of state programs did not design more elaborate monitoring
and enforcement approaches for lead screening services than for dental care
services. Rather, they either adopted approaches that focused more on the monitoring
of dental care than lead screening or adopted the same monitoring approach for both
types of services.
The first group of programs (four state programs) had more elaborate plans for
monitoring the provision of dental care than lead screening. For example, one state
program uses one performance measure specific to dental care (i.e., annual dental visit)
with three levels of performance (i.e., minimums, goals, benchmarks). In contrast, that
same state uses the federal participation goal for the EPSDT well-child visit without
tailoring it to lead screening services. For this program, setting specific lead screening
performance measures is less of a focus because of the very low prevalence of
childhood lead poisoning in the state. Another state program uses performance
measures specific to dental care, though with no performance minimums yet, but does
not use any performance measures specific to lead screening. In this case, the program
expects to set benchmarks for dental care at a later date once it knows “what is
happening out there” and has an interest in developing measures specific to lead
screening but it is currently less of a focus than dental care, partly because the program
is seen as emulating the commercial market, where issues surrounding lead are not a
priority. The last two programs are less advanced in their monitoring of dental services
but nevertheless are more involved in monitoring dental services than they are in
monitoring lead screening services.
Indeed, neither program enforces the lead
component of well-child services because both see monitoring and enforcement of lead
screening as the responsibility of the department of health. In addition, one program
underscored the low prevalence of childhood lead poisoning in the state and the other
program the lack of federal requirements in this area as additional justifications for their
lack of enforcement of lead standards.
The second group of programs (two state programs) had adopted the same
monitoring approach for the provision of both dental care and lead screening. One
program has performance measures specific to dental care and lead screening services,
with performance minimums and goals, although it currently looks for an annual
percentage increase in performance compared to the previous year. The other program
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does not focus on quality improvement for either dental care or lead screening but
rather on ensuring access to care through the use of a quantifiable access standard that
applies to all pediatric services.
The third group of programs (five state programs) had more elaborate plans for
monitoring the provision of lead screening than dental care, mostly driven by the fact
that for these programs the federal requirements are more specific on lead screening
than on dental care. One program has performance measures specific to the well-child
visit, with an additional performance minimum for lead screening only. It uses several
data sources to determine the rate of dental service and referral and EPSDT data to
determine the rate of lead screenings. These rates then serve as a baseline for
improvement on an annual basis and the program gives plans incentives to increase
performance. Additionally, the program shares enrollment files with the department of
health, which created a database on lead screening, and shares plan-specific data with
plans. Three programs use minimum performance standards for the well-child visit,
which are not specific to either dental care or lead screening, but also track the
provision of lead screening services through data (two of these programs do not track
dental utilization very closely). The first of these two programs uses plan-specific Form
416 data and an integrated data warehouse on lead screening. It also started collecting
encounter data and generating plan-specific profiles with the long range goal of
collecting and monitoring lead screening data on a quarterly basis. The second
program requires submission of encounter data and is currently piloting a HEDIS-like
measure to look at lead screening prevalence by plan. The third program not only uses
EPSDT statistics but also has access to surveillance data from the department of health
and performs geographic analyses to work with plans to do outreach. Finally, one
program does not have performance measures for either dental care or lead screening.
It tracks the provision of dental services through dental statistics, and uses the rate of
lead screenings from the previous year as a baseline for improvement in the following
year. It gives plans incentives to improve performance on lead screening and works
closely with the department of health to set up the incentives.
4.

Summary of Findings on Monitoring and Enforcement of Standards

Overall, our findings show that, in the aggregate, states in our sample had
addressed each key component of a state monitoring plan, i.e., they had developed a
formal plan with clear goals, assignments, measurements, and milestones, prevention
strategies, coordination strategies, detection strategies, enforcement strategies, and
reporting strategies. There was variation in the degree to which the ten elements that
have been identified as important to effective implementation were fulfilled. More
specifically, we found that:
• In the aggregate, states had clearly stated their policy goals related to the
provision of oral health and lead screening services (element one).
• All states had some contract provisions on the coverage of oral health and
lead screening services, and standards for measuring compliance with the contract
provisions (element two). They varied in how specific those provisions were,
however.
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• All states had created a mechanism for monitoring compliance, which
consisted of data collected at regular intervals and used to measure compliance of
health plans with quantifiable standards. States varied greatly, however, in the extent
to which they had established quantifiable quality performance standards (element
three).
• All states had designated an agency responsible for implementing the policy
goals related to pediatric services, including oral health and lead screening services
(element four). However, in several states, the lead agency (Medicaid or SCHIP
agency) shared roles and responsibilities with other agencies in the area of managed
care, lead screening surveillance, and dental carve-outs that had the potential for
adding layers of complexity to its oversight duties and raised issues of coordination
among the various agencies concerned.
• The majority of respondents stated that the personnel responsible for
implementation were committed to promoting the stated policy goals (element five)
and enjoyed the support of their superiors in doing so (element six), both for oral
health and lead screening. Policy beneficiaries, on the other hand, were described
as demonstrating varying degrees of organization and cohesive support toward the
implementation of policy goals related to oral health and lead screening (element
seven). In three states, managed care organizations showed strong support for both
oral health and lead screening goals; in two states, they showed support to both but
questioned the adequacy of resources to achieve those goals; in two states, managed
care organizations were unanimously opposed to the lead screening goals, and in
one of these two states, they did not focus on oral health at all; and finally, in one
state, while the health plan showed support to both goals, network providers did not,
making it difficult for the plan to achieve the goals.
• The majority of states had undertaken efforts with the various agencies
responsible for achieving the policy goals toward administrative coordination
(element eight), but these efforts varied in their level of formality depending on the
agency and the state. For all states, coordination efforts with the Attorney General’s
office did not entail any close relationship, but rather informal referrals when
needed. In terms of coordination efforts with the department of insurance, several
states described a close working relationship through, for example, regular meetings,
but several other states only had an episodic relationship or no relationship at all
with the department. As far as coordination efforts with the department of health, all
Medicaid agencies had a relationship with the division in charge of lead surveillance,
albeit in varying levels of formality, and none of the SCHIP agencies had such a
relationship. In contrast, in the area of oral health, the majority of agencies, whether
they were Medicaid or SCHIP agencies, did not have relationship at all with the
department. Finally, all three SCHIP agencies described a close relationship with
their sister Medicaid agency.
• Many states had designed a graduated system of incentives and penalties,
which they believed favored compliance (element nine), but most states, even those
with high levels of managed care penetration, approached enforcement more as a
collaboration with plans, mostly because of the underlying health system’s issues
that are beyond the control of either the state or the plan.
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• The direct involvement of the federal government varied by state (element
ten), but it seemed to adopt a more active role on behalf of children protected by
the policies on oral health and lead screening in its oversight of state Medicaid
programs than in its oversight of state SCHIP programs, particularly in the area of
lead screening.
Although our findings do not allow us to rank the ten elements in their order of
importance in achieving successful implementation of the policy goals related to oral
health and lead screening, these findings suggest that state monitoring and enforcement
is strongly influenced by the conditions of the local markets in which the programs
operate, and, as a consequence, may lose some of its leverage in ensuring that children
have access to quality care. At the same time, the findings suggest that states adapt their
strategies to those conditions in order to achieve the best possible outcomes for
children under the circumstances.
We also found some noticeable differences in approaches to monitoring and
enforcing pediatric contractual standards across states depending on the degree of
managed care penetration and the type of program design in effect in the state. First,
managed care penetration was a factor on whether a state had specified quality
performance indicators and the extent to which it was able to garner support from
managed care plans and providers for their quality goals, particularly as they related to
lead screening. This suggests that, if states opt to use managed care to deliver pediatric
services, they need a sufficiently strong managed care market upon which to build a
system of care than can be truly monitored and enforced. However, our findings also
suggest that, even in states that have high levels of managed care penetration,
underlying problems of access to care and provider supply that disproportionately affect
the population they serve impair states’ ability to ensure plan compliance with their
expectations regarding the provision of quality pediatric services.
Second, because of the differences in the federal law that regulates the
monitoring and enforcement obligations of Medicaid and SCHIP agencies, Medicaid and
SCHIP programs emphasized different areas for quality improvement. One of the major
differences noted was the emphasis on oral health exhibited by those states with
separate SCHIP programs in operation, whether or not the programs used the same
service delivery system as Medicaid. In contrast, oral health disease, which is a high
prevalence condition, was not as given as much emphasis as lead poisoning, a low
prevalence condition, in Medicaid programs, including SCHIP Medicaid expansion
programs. This is most likely because Medicaid agencies are subject to a variety of
federal obligations, which put a particular stress on lead screening and poisoning issues.
Oral health care is not as stringently prescribed in Medicaid law.
Finally, the evidence gathered in the context of this study did not support our
assumption that states would design more elaborate monitoring and enforcement plans
for the pediatric standard aimed at a low prevalence condition (here, childhood lead
poisoning) than for the pediatric standard aimed at a high prevalence condition (here,
oral disease). Rather, they either adopted approaches that focused more on the
monitoring of dental care than lead screening or adopted the same monitoring
approach for both types of services.
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D.

Conclusions

States play a significant role in ensuring health care quality and face a complex
task because many different parties may be involved in monitoring and enforcement,
some of whom may not have designed themselves the performance standards by which
quality is measured. The Attorney General’s office assumes the lead on fraud and
abuse, the department of insurance on fiscal solvency and legitimate business practices,
and Medicaid and SCHIP agencies on service delivery. The level of interaction between
these various branches of government varies by state but generally speaking, each sees
its area of jurisdiction as very delineated and as needing coordination only on a caseby-case basis. In their capacity as large purchasers of health care, Medicaid and SCHIP
agencies are both distributors of information about managed care quality and regulators
of contractual relationships between managed care organizations and the purchaser,
and enrollees and providers. This study was intended to look at how Medicaid and
SCHIP agencies perform both of these tasks. It examined not only why states included
certain standards in their contracts but also how they ensured accountability or
compliance with those standards. Thus, this study is the story of the “ideal world” states
formulate in their contractual standards, and the reality states face in implementing these
expectations in the “real world.”
Our findings on the logic of Medicaid and SCHIP contract performance standard
selection indicate that states do pay attention to the contract. Although the level of
specificity varied across states, contractual provisions generally addressed the service
components of oral health and lead screening as well as the periodicity with which they
should be provided. Differences between Medicaid and SCHIP agencies in the
specificity of the contractual provisions were typically driven by existing federal
requirements related to benefits. These findings suggest that, unless the federal
government specifies the content of coverage and the periodicity with which it should
be furnished, states will be more likely to follow professional and industry practice and
forego attempts to raise the bar in health care quality for children. They further suggest
that the federal government will be more likely to specify the content of coverage and
the periodicity with which it should be furnished in the case of low prevalence
conditions that are attached to public health concerns. If those federal specifications
reflect an advance beyond current norms, as one can expect in the case of low
prevalence conditions, states may run into serious implementation problems, as our
interviews seemed to indicate in the case of childhood lead poisoning.
Our findings on the implementation of Medicaid and SCHIP managed care
monitoring and enforcement indicate that states generally perform some contract
monitoring. State approaches were very idiosyncratic, a variation that can be explained
by the local conditions that define the delivery system. Legislation is usually broad in
that regard and probably should remain that way so that states can tailor their
approaches to what is happening at the local level. This set of findings also revealed
that states do not generally consider the contract as all encompassing on quality
improvement because it cannot appropriately address systemic issues. These underlying
delivery system problems mean that contractual language and contract enforcement lose
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some of their power and that states must turn to other strategies, such as community
awareness, to deal with these underlying issues.
Taken together, these two sets of findings have important policy implications.
First, they have important implications for children’s right to coverage under Medicaid
and SCHIP, which is a crucial issue upon which the current debate on reforming
Medicaid hinges. As stated earlier, because the contracts represent the sum total of the
health care children will receive under either program, the pediatric standards that are
specified in the contracts, as well as states’ performance monitoring, contract
enforcement, and access to patient protections become of the utmost importance. The
fairly low level of monitoring described in this study and the limited direct access to
patient protections for both coverage and quality issues described elsewhere brings into
light the issue of a private right of enforcement by beneficiaries. Even though Medicaid
is usually considered to be insurance, it is distinct in certain aspects and functions
according to principles that do not prevail in the private insurance market. More
specifically, the contract between states and managed care organizations may or may
not constitute a contract of insurance, unless certain elements are fulfilled (e.g., the
contract makes beneficiaries a party to the contract and requires insurers to obtain a
license of insurance). Our research in this area indicates that two of the study states
have third party beneficiary rights defined in their contract (one granting Medicaid
beneficiaries third party beneficiary rights, the other explicitly denying those rights) and
none require insurers to hold a license of insurance. This could lead courts to question
the nature of the contract as a contract of insurance and the existence of a private right
to enforce the contract. In the absence of such a right, the recognition of a mandatory
federal individual entitlement as is the case with Medicaid becomes a key component in
ensuring that children have access to the services they need.
Second, our findings have important implications for children with special health
care needs. The higher prevalence of children with special health care needs in
Medicaid and SCHIP than in the general population warrants particular efforts on the
part of states to monitor the quality of care received by these children. While this
research did not specifically focus on children with special needs, its findings on state
monitoring of contractual standards targeting childhood lead poisoning suggest that,
even when the federal government steps in to define with specificity benefits aimed at
low prevalence childhood conditions and attempts to raise the bar in quality for
children suffering from these conditions, states encounter problems in their monitoring
efforts because of resistance at the local level to what is perceived as a waste of
resources. This contradiction explains in part the fairly low level of monitoring
described in this study. It also points to the need for approaches that are external to the
contract, if states want to be successful in their monitoring of low prevalence childhood
conditions.
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Type of
Remedy
Corrective
action plan
Liquidated or
exemplary
damages
Suspension of
new
enrollment
Disenrollment
of current
enrollees
Withholding
from capitation
payments
MCO payment
for out-of-plan
care
State payment
to out-of-plan
provider
Adjusting
capitation
payment rates
Receivership
by state
Medicaid
agency
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non-renewal of
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TABLE A.I: Intermediate Remedies in Selected State Medicaid and SCHIP Risk Contracts, 2000
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X
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X
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Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), www.gwhealthpolicy.org
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and accurate encounter data
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Failure to provide quality
care
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Cause
Failure to comply with
contract
X
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1. Provision in general service agreement only; 2. Provision in behavioral health contract only; 3. Provision in general service agreement only; 4.
Provision in behavioral health contract only

Failure to submit
data in specified
format

X1

X1

Failure to comply
with state laws
and regulations

Failure to submit
corrective action
plan or meet
requirements of
corrective action
plan
Failure to comply
with marketing
requirements

X

X1

X

X

X

CA

1

AZ

Failure to comply
with contract
Failure to provide
medically
necessary
services
Discrimination of
enrollees on the
basis of health
status or need
Misrepresentation
or falsification or
information
Failure to comply
with federal laws
and regulations

Cause(*)

TABLE A.III: Frequently Cited Causes of Liquidated or Exemplary Damages, Medicaid & SCHIP Contracts (2000)

26

(*) Other less frequently causes under Medicaid included: failure to comply with network development and access to services requirements (IN,
MA behavioral health); failure to comply with federal and state reporting requirements regarding abortions, hysterectomies and sterilizations (WI);
failure to comply with quality improvement requirements (IN); failure to address cultural competency (IN); failure to comply with performance
standards (MA behavioral health).
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Unremedied
breach within a
specified time

Failure to comply
with marketing
requirements

Failure to provide
medically
necessary
services
Failure to
maintain
financial viability
or meet financial
soundness
requirements

Failure to comply
with state laws
and regulations

Failure to comply
with federal laws
and regulations

Failure to comply
with contract

Cause

X1

A
Z

CA

X

CO

X3

X3

X3

FL

X

X

X

IN

NY

OH

X

X4

X

X

X

X

X

X

X4,5

X

X

X

X4

S
C

TX

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

CONTRACTOR VIOLATIONS

MEDICAID
MI MN NJ

X4

X4

X4

X4

MA

X

X

WA

X

WI

Failure to meet
statutory
financial
requirements
or to comply
with solvency
requirements
Brokers’ fees,
contingency
fees, bribes,
gratuities, or
kickbacks paid
to secure
agreement
Unremedied
breach within
a specified

Failure to
comply with
contract
Significant
changes in
network
composition
that negatively
affect enrollee
access to
services
Enrollment
procedures
resulting in a
pattern and
practice of
inappropriate
enrollment
Failure to meet
licensing
requirements

Cause

X

CA

X

CO

X

X

X

X

X

SCHIP
MI M
S

TABLE A.IV: Frequently Cited Causes of Termination, Medicaid & SCHIP Contracts (2000)

X

X

X

NY

X

TX

A
Z

CO

FL

X

IN

X5

X5

X4

X4

MA
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X

X

X

X

X

X

NY

X

X

OH

X

X

S
C

X

X

TX

WA

WI

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
CAUSES OTHER THAN CONTRACTOR VIOLATIONS

X

X

MEDICAID
MI MN NJ

Lack of
funding,
appropriated
funds
State no longer
needs service

Commencemen
t of bankruptcy
proceedings
Failure to meet
quality
assurance
requirements

time period
Failure to
provide access
to data,
documents,
information

Cause
CA

CO

X

X

X

X

X

SCHIP
MI M
S

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), www.gwhealthpolicy.org

X

X

X

CA

1. Provision in the general service agreement only
2. Provision in the behavioral health contract only

Protection of
enrollees from
injury

Best interest of
the state

period
Loss of
qualification for
licensure,
certificate of
authority, or
certification
Commencement
of bankruptcy
proceedings
Failure to comply
with quality
improvement
requirements
Failure to comply
with network
development and
access to services
requirements
Failure to provide
quality services
Failure to
monitor network
providers
Failure to comply
with
performance
standards or
benchmarks
Fraud or abuse

Cause

X

NY

X

TX
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3. Provision in the general service agreement only
4. Provision in the general service agreement only
5. Provision in the behavioral health contract only

ENFORCEMENT PAPER APPENDICES

APPENDIX I:
[Individual Medicaid/SCHIP Tables from Contract Analysis]

MEDICAID TABLES

TABLE A.I: Causes of Disenrollment of Current Enrollees,
Medicaid Contracts (2000)
IN
Failure to comply with
contract
Failure to comply with
Federal laws and regulations
Failure to provide services
Failure to maintain or provide
records

MA

NJ

SC

X

X

TX

WI

X
X

X
X

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org

TABLE A.II: Causes for Adjusting Capitation Payment Rates,
Medicaid Contracts (2000)
AZ
Failure to comply with
contract
Failure to comply with
Federal laws and regulations
Failure to comply with state
laws and regulations
Failure to submit data
Failure to comply with
timeliness and accuracy of
claims processing
Failure to maintain medical
loss ratio
Failure to use Medicaid
certified providers

X

CA

MA

X

2

X

MN

NJ

X

OH

SC

X

X

TX

X
X
1

X

X
X
X

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org
1.
2.

WI

Provision found in the behavioral health contract only.
Provision found in the behavioral health contract only.

X

TABLE A.III: Causes of Corrective Action Plans, Medicaid Contracts (2000)
Failure to comply with contract
Failure to comply with state laws
and regulations
Failure to provide quality care
Failure to maintain efficient
delivery system
Failure to provide complete and
accurate encounter data
Failure to comply with EPSDT
screening rate
Failure to comply with the
annual PCP turnover rate
Failure to comply with marketing
guidelines
Failure to meet financial stability

FL
X1

IN

MA
X3

NJ

NY

OH
X

SC
X

X
X

X

X
X4
X2
X5
X
X

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Provision
Provision
Provision
Provision
Provision

found
found
found
found
found

in
in
in
in
in

the behavioral health contract only.
the behavioral health contract only.
both the general service agreement and the behavioral health contract
the general service agreement only.
the general service agreement only.

TABLE A.IV: Causes of Liquidated or Exemplary Damages, Medicaid Contracts
(2000)
Failure to
comply with
contract
Failure to
comply with
Federal laws
and regulations
Failure to
comply with
state laws and
regulations
Failure to
provide
medically
necessary
services
Failure to
submit
corrective
action plan or
meet
requirements of
corrective
action plan
Discrimination
of enrollees on
the basis of
health status or
need
Failure to
comply with
marketing
requirements
Failure to
comply with
enrollment
requirements
Failure to
comply with
network
development
and access to
services
requirements
Failure to
comply with
physician
incentive plan
requirements
Failure to
submit data,
medical
records, or
other
information or
failure to
submit them in
required form
or format by

AZ

CA

X1

CO

FL

IN

MA

X

X3

X

X4

X1

X

X3

X1

X

X3

MN

NJ

X

X

NY

OH

SC

TX

X

X

X

X

WA

WI

X

X1

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X4

X

X2

X

X

X4

X

X

X

X

X

AZ
specified
deadline
Failure to
comply with
Federal and
state reporting
requirements
regarding
abortions,
hysterectomies
and
sterilizations
Failure to
comply with
quality
improvement
requirements
Failure to
address cultural
competency
Failure to have
credentialing
policies in
place and
procedures for
monitoring and
sanctioning
providers or
failure to
adhere to
licensure of
staff
requirements
Failure to make
payments to
network
providers
Failure to
comply with
performance
standards
Failure to
cooperate in
carrying out an
administrative,
investigative or
prosecutorial
function of the
Medicaid
program
Failure to
comply with
prohibition to
impose
copayments or
premiums
Failure to
maintain the
medical loss
ratio and any
losses if funds
incurred by the
state due to

CA

CO

FL

IN

MA

MN

NJ

NY

OH

SC

TX

WA

WI

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X4

X

X

X

X

AZ
contractor’s
noncompliance
Failure to enter
into a required
contract or
failure to
contract for all
services
required under
the contract
Misrepresentation or
falsification or
information
Offer of
employment or
gratuity to
influence
outcome of
procurement or
secure contract
Employment or
contracting
abuses

CA

CO

FL

IN

MA

MN

NJ

NY

OH

SC

TX

X

X

X1

X
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org

1.
2.
3.
4.

Provision
Provision
Provision
Provision

in
in
in
in

general service agreement only
behavioral health contract only
general service agreement only
behavioral health contract only

WA

WI

TABLE A.V: Causes of MCO Payment for Out-of-plan Care,
Medicaid Contracts (2000)
Failure to comply with contract
Failure to comply with laws and
regulations

FL
X1
X1

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org
1. Provision in general service agreement only

TABLE A.VI: Causes of Receivership, Medicaid Contracts (2000)
MA
Failure to comply with contract
Failure to comply with Federal laws and regulations
Egregious behavior
Substantial risk to the health of enrollees
Failure to cure default within given period of time after
notification

NJ
X
X

SC
X

TX
X
X
X

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org

WA
X
X

X

TABLE A.VII: Causes of Withholding from Capitation Payments,
Medicaid Contracts (2000)
AZ
Failure to comply
with contract
Failure to comply
with Federal laws
and regulations
Failure to comply
with state laws
and regulations
Termination
Failure to provide
medically
necessary services
Failure to comply
with financial
soundness
requirements
Failure to comply
with reporting
requirements
Failure to comply
with cultural
competency
requirements
Failure to have
credentialing
policies and
procedures for
monitoring and
sanctioning
providers
Failure to pay
network providers
Discrimination
against any
qualified
employee or
applicant for
employment or
other
discriminatory
practices (e.g.,
against enrollee
based on health
status)
Imposition of
premiums or
charges in excess
of allowable
amounts
Misrepresentation
or falsification of
information
Failure to comply
with physician
incentive plan
requirements
Failure to make
payments to state,
including

CO
X

X1

FL
2

X

IN
X

MA
4

X

MI

MN

NJ

X

X

X

NY

OH

SC

TX

X

X

X

WA

WI

X

X

X2
X2

X
X4

X

X
X

X

X4

X3

X

X

X

X

X4

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

AZ

CO

FL

IN

MA

MI

MN

NJ

NY

OH

SC

TX

payment of
liquidated
damages related to
failure to
complete action
required by
corrective action
plan
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org
1.
2.
3.
4.

Provision
Provision
Provision
Provision

in
in
in
in

general service agreement only
general service agreement only
behavioral health contract only
behavioral health contract only

WA

WI

TABLE A.VIII: Causes of Recoupment of State Payment to
Out-of-plan Providers, Medicaid Contracts (2000)
CO
Failure to reimburse covered services when contractor
has received a monthly prepayment to provide these
services and enrollee has moved outside of
contractor’s service area

X

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org

TABLE A.IX: Causes of Suspension of New Enrollment, Medicaid Contracts (2000)
AZ
Failure to comply
with contract
Failure to comply
with Federal laws
and regulations
Failure to comply
with state laws
and regulations
Failure to comply
with marketing
guidelines
Failure to comply
with enrollment
requirements
Failure to comply
with financial
viability
standards or
adverse action by
department of
insurance
Failure to comply
with provider
network
requirements
Failure to comply
with
credentialing
policies and
procedures and
procedures for
monitoring and
sanctioning
providers
Failure to pay
network
providers
Failure to submit
data
Failure to comply
with quality of
care and quality
management
requirements
Failure to comply
with cultural
competency
requirements
Failure to pay
liquidated
damages within
specified
timeframe
Failure to
implement
corrective action
plan in timely
manner
Commission of
egregious first-

CO
X

FL

IN

2

X

X

MA

MI

MN

NJ

X

X

NY

OH

SC

TX

WA

WI

X

X

X

X

X

X
X1

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X1

X

X1

X

X

X
X1

X1

X

X2

X

X

X

X

X

AZ

CO

FL

IN

MA

MI

time infraction
Misrepresentation or fraud
Exclusion of
Medicaid or
Medicare
Placing health
and safety of
enrollees in
jeopardy

MN

NJ

NY

OH

SC

TX

WA

WI

X
X

X

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org
1. Provision in the general service agreement only
2. Provision in the general service agreement only

X

TABLE A.X: Causes of Termination, Medicaid Contracts (2000)
AZ
Contractor
violations:
Failure to
comply with
contract
Failure to
comply with
Federal laws
and
regulations
Failure to
comply with
state laws
and
regulations
Failure to
meet
requirements
for
participation
in the
Medicaid
program
Failure to
provide
medically
necessary
services
Failure to
accept state
capitation
payment
Failure to
maintain
financial
viability or
meet
financial
soundness
requirements
Failure to pay
liquidated
damages
within
specified
timeframe
Failure to
take
corrective
action or
comply with
any
corrective
action plan
Discrimination of
enrollees on
the basis of
health status

CA

X1

C
O

FL

IN

MA

X

X3

X

X4

X3

X4

X3

X4

MI

MN

NJ

NY

OH

SC

TX

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X4

X

X

X4

X

X4,5

X

X

X

X4

X4

X

X

X

X

WI

X

X

X

X1

WA

AZ
or need
Failure to
comply with
marketing
requirements
Failure to
comply with
network
development
and access to
services
requirements
Failure to
provide
quality
services
Failure to
comply with
quality
improvement
requirements
Failure to
monitor
network
providers
Failure to
make
payments to
network
providers
Failure to
comply with
performance
standards or
benchmarks
Imposition of
charges on
enrollees in
excess of
allowable
amount
Unremedied
breach
within a
specified
time period
Egregious
first-time
infraction
Misrepresenta
tion or
falsification
or
information
Offer of
gratuity to
influence
outcome of
procurement
or secure
contract
Conflict of

CA

C
O

FL

IN

MA

MI

MN

X4

NJ

NY

X

X

X

OH

SC

TX

WA

WI

X

X

X4

X

X

X

X

X

X4

X

X4

X

X

X

X

X4

X1

X1

X

AZ
interest
Adverse
action by
department
of insurance
Exclusion
from
participation
in Medicare,
Medicaid and
SCHIP
Debarment,
suspension
or
prohibition
from
participation
in any public
procurement
activity
Loss of
qualification
for licensure,
certificate of
authority, or
certification
Discrimination in
employment
or other
violations in
employment
Appointment
of a receiver,
trustee or
liquidator
Commencement of
bankruptcy
proceedings
Fraud or
abuse
Other reasons
for
termination:
Change in
state needs
Lack of
appropriated
amounts for
the
continuation
of the
program
Best interest
of the state
Protection of
enrollees
from injury
Protection of
state or

CA

C
O

FL

IN

MA

MI

MN

NJ

NY

OH

SC

TX

X

X1

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X5

X

X4

X4

X

X

X

X5

X

X

X2

X
X

X

X

X

X5

X

X

X5

X

X

X

X

WA

WI

AZ

CA

C
O

FL

IN

MA

MI

MN

NJ

NY

OH

SC

TX

Federal funds
or property
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Provision
Provision
Provision
Provision
Provision

in
in
in
in
in

the
the
the
the
the

general service agreement only
behavioral health contract only
general service agreement only
general service agreement only
behavioral health contract only

WA

WI

SCHIP TABLES

TABLE B.I: Causes of Corrective Action Plans, SCHIP Contracts (2000)
CA
Failure to comply with access standards specified
in contract
Knowledge that representations or warranties
regarding a participating provider may be untrue
or incorrect
Hindrance of enrollee access to covered services
due to inability of providers within plan to accept
additional enrollees as patients
Deficiency or event causing an assessment of a
liquidated damage

CO

NY

TX

X
X
X
X

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org

TABLE B.II: Causes of Liquidated or Exemplary Damages, SCHIP Contracts (2000)
CA
Failure to comply with contract
Failure to establish coverage and related
administrative services
Failure to substantially provide medically necessary
services
Failure to comply with objective performance
standards monitored by state
Failure to cure default within specified time period
Discrimination on the basis of health status or need
Misrepresentation or falsification of information
Imposition of premiums or charges in excess of
allowable amount
Failure to file anti-lobbying certificate

MS

TX
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org

TABLE B.III: Causes of Suspension of New Enrollment, SCHIP Contracts (2000)
Failure to comply with contract
Default declared as a result of imminent danger
to health and safety of enrollees

CA
X

CO
X

TX
X
X

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org

TABLE B.IV: Causes of Termination, SCHIP Contracts (2000)
Contractor violations:
Failure to comply with contract
Significant changes in network composition that negatively
affect enrollee access to services
Enrollment procedures resulting in a pattern and practice of
inappropriate enrollment
Deficiencies in quality assurance
Failure to meet licensing requirements
Failure to meet statutory financial requirements or to comply
with solvency requirements
Failure to provide access to data, documents, information
Unremedied breach within specified time period
Criminal conviction incident to application for or
performance of state, public or private contract or
subcontract or other criminal offenses (e.g., embezzlement,
theft, forgery)
Assignment for the benefit of creditors, appointment of
receiver, or bankruptcy proceedings
Brokers’ fees, contingency fees, bribes, gratuities, or kickbacks
paid to secure agreement
Conflict of interest
Discrimination in employment
Other reasons for termination:
Changes in program, laws, regulations
State no longer needs services
Lack of funding, appropriated funds
Final administrative or judicial decision or adjudication
disapproves a previously approved request for purchase of
personal services

CA

CO

MI

X

X

X

MS

NY

TX

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org

X

TABLE B.V: Causes of Withholding from Capitation Payments, SCHIP Contracts
(2000)
CA
Failure to comply with contract
Failure to make payments to CAHPS vendor

CO
X

X

Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001),
www.gwhealthpolicy.org

ENFORCEMENT PAPER APPENDICES

APPENDIX II:
[Tables from Interview Analysis]

Table 1. State Approaches to Performance Measurement of Oral Health Standards
General Approach

States with clinical
performance measures

States without clinical
performance measures but
with monitoring of dental
services through data
collection
States without clinical
performance measures and
monitoring of dental
services through data
collection

Specific Approach
 State program uses one performance measure specific to dental
care (i.e., annual dental visit) with three levels of performance:
(1) performance minimums, or the minimum performance
expected from health plans (i.e., 45% of members must have
received an annual dental visit); (2) performance goals, or
reachable standards (i.e., 55% of members must have received an
annual dental visit); (3) performance benchmarks, or ultimate
goals. Program also expects health plans to show improvement
from year to year.
 State program has performance measures specific to dental care,
with performance minimums and performance goals, but program
currently looks for annual percentage increase in performance
compared to previous year.
 Four state programs have performance measures specific to EPSDT
well-child visit, with performance minimums, such as Federal
participation goals.
o First program uses Federal and state goals of participation as a
performance minimum; it also uses EPSDT statistics to track
the provision of dental services.
o Second program sets performance minimums low with the
goal to increase them gradually over time.
o Third program uses Federal goal of
participation as a
performance minimum; it also uses several data sources to
determine rate of dental service and referral, which serves as a
baseline for improvement on an annual basis, and gives plans
incentives to increase performance.
o Fourth program uses state goal of participation as a
performance minimum; while it uses the rate of EPSDT wellchild visits as a starting point to determine whether children
receive dental care, it plans to use historical data on oral
screening to set future performance goals.
 State program sets annual minimum performance levels for the
HEDIS well-child visit, but they are not specific to any pediatric
services delivered during the visit except for immunizations.
Program does not measure access to or quality of dental care
because it defers to a carve-out managed dental care program to
perform these monitoring tasks; although dental referrals
constitute the link between the main managed care program and
the carved-out program, the program has not yet looked at
referrals.
 State program has performance measures specific to dental care,
with no performance minimums yet. Program expects to set
benchmarks at a later date once it knows “what is happening out
there.”
 Two state programs have no performance measures, but use
dental statistics to track the provision of dental services.

 State program does not focus on quality improvement but on
ensuring access to care. Program uses a quantifiable access
standard (i.e., 90 percent of children must have access to a
pediatrician within 10 miles), though it is not specific dental care.

Source: GW CHSRP, 2003.

Table 2. State Approaches to Performance Measurement of Lead Screening
Standards
General approach

States with clinical
performance measures

States without clinical
performance measures but
with monitoring of lead

Specific approach
 State program has performance measures specific to lead screening
services, with performance minimums and performance goals, but
program currently looks for annual percentage increase in
performance compared to previous year.
 Four state programs have performance measures specific to EPSDT
well-child visit, with performance minimums, such as federal
participation goals.
o The first program uses federal participation goal as performance
minimum and Form 416 EPSDT data as baseline data.
Otherwise, the department of health is the lead and the program
is working with the department to improve data analysis and set
long term goals for targeted screening. Program awaits future
guidance from CMS regarding targeted screening before setting
performance standards specific to lead. Currently, the program is
notified by the department of health with the names and the
birth dates of children with elevated blood lead levels who are
identified as enrolled in the program. Following verification of
eligibility and health plan enrollment, the program contacts the
plan for follow-up. Operational and financial reviews focus on
whether plans follow-up with the necessary services and
whether plans monitor providers to determine if a screen is done
according to federal guidelines and the state’s EPSDT periodicity
schedule.
o The second program uses federal and state participation goals as
performance minima and EPSDT statistics to track the provision
of lead screening services. Otherwise, program has access to
surveillance data from the department of health and performs
geographic analysis to work with plans to do outreach.
o The third program sets performance minimums low with the goal
to increase them gradually over time. Program also tracks the
provision of lead screening services through Form 416 data,
including plan specific Form 416 data and, more recently,
through an integrated data warehouse with state laboratories.
Finally, the program just started to collect encounter data and
generating plan-specific profiles, with the long range goal of
collecting and monitoring lead screening data on a quarterly
basis.
o The fourth program uses federal participation goal for both the
EPSDT visit and lead screening services and EPSDT data to
determine the rate of lead screening service, which serves as a
baseline for improvement on annual basis. Program gives plans
incentives to increase performance. Department of health
created a database on lead screening. Program shares enrollment
files with the department of health and shares the data with
plans, which are separated by plan.
 State program sets annual minimum performance levels for the HEDIS
well-child visit, but they are not specific to any pediatric services
delivered during the visit except for immunizations. Program
requires submission of encounter data, which are supposed to
capture EPSDT encounters and the elements of the EPSDT visit, and
is now working with plans on improving the data. They are
currently piloting a HEDIS-like measure to look at lead screening
prevalence by plan. The program plans to require a minimum
performance level for this HEDIS-like measure when it will make it a
contractual requirement in 2004.
 State program has no performance measures, but uses the rate of lead
screening service from the previous year as a baseline for
improvement in the following year. Program gives plans incentives

General approach
screening services through
data collection

States without clinical
performance measures and
monitoring of lead
screening services through
data collection

States without any
monitoring

Specific approach
to improve performance and works closely with the department of
health to set up the incentives. Otherwise, it tracks the billing code
of laboratories performing blood lead tests from claims data.
 State program has no performance measures, but uses HEDIS data to
track the provision of well-child services; interest exists in
developing measures specific to lead screening but it is currently less
of a focus than dental care.
 State program does not focus on quality improvement but on
ensuring access to care. Program uses a quantifiable access standard
(i.e., 90 percent of children must have access to a pediatrician
within 10 miles), though it is not specific lead screening.
 State program does not have any performance standards and
monitoring plan; both are the responsibility of the department of
health, with which the SCHIP agency has no collaboration as of
now.
 State program does not enforce lead component of EPSDT; the
department of health is responsible for monitoring lead in the state
because of their population-based approach.
Source: GW CHSRP, 2003.

Table 3. State Distribution by Degree of Managed Care Penetration

States with high levels of managed care
penetration (n=7)

States with medium levels of managed
care penetration (n=1)

States with low levels of managed care
penetration (n=1)

Seven states fell into this category. The level of managed
care penetration ranged from a low 23 percent to a high
52 percent of the general population enrolled in HMOs.
Except for one state, all states had a majority of their
Medicaid enrollees in managed care (range: 54-100
percent). Six states had all, or close to all, of their
Medicaid managed care enrollees enrolled in full-risk
MCOs, and one state had about 50 percent of its Medicaid
managed care enrollees enrolled in full-risk MCOs. All
states had 100 percent, or close to 100 percent, of their
SCHIP enrollees enrolled in managed care and in full-risk
MCOs. One state had all of its Medicaid and SCHIP
enrollees in managed care and in full-risk managed care.
One state fell into this category, with a 17 percent HMO
penetration rate. This state had all of its Medicaid
enrollees in managed care and in full-risk managed care,
and about 80 percent of its SCHIP enrollees in managed
care and in full-risk managed care.
One state fell into this category, with less than two
percent of the general population enrolled in managed
care. In this state, approximately half of the Medicaid
enrollees are in managed care but none are in full-risk. In
contrast, all SCHIP enrollees are in managed care.

Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, State Health Facts, http://www.kff.org

Table 4. State Distribution by Type of Program Design

States with
Medicaid and
SCHIP Medicaid
expansion
programs (n=2)

States with
Medicaid and
separate SCHIP
programs, with
SCHIP contract
integrated with
Medicaid contract
(n=4)

Two states fell into this category. All Federal Medicaid requirements apply,
including those relating to benefits and program monitoring and
enforcement. Federal law requires states to have a quality improvement
plan in place, which should include quality and access standards, but
leaves it up to states to determine the details of the plan and standards.
Federal law also requires coverage and monitoring of EPSDT services.
Oral screening and referral to a dentist are required as part of EPSDT
screening services, more specifically the physical examination required
under the program. In addition, other necessary care (i.e., diagnosis,
treatment) discovered by the screen should be covered. At a minimum, this
should include emergency, preventive and therapeutic services, as defined
in law, to relieve pain and infections, restore teeth, and maintain dental
health. Dental services must be provided at intervals that meet reasonable
standards of medical and dental practice and should be set after consulting
with recognized medical and dental organizations involved in children’s
health care. CMS, ADA, AAP, and AAFP recommend a direct referral to a
dentist at 3 years old or earlier if medically necessary and greater frequency
of dental visits than physical examinations for older children (AAPD
recommends a dental visit within six months of the eruption of the first
tooth and no later than the child’s first birthday, and subsequently a
minimum of two visits per year).
Lead screening is also part of EPSDT screening services, more specifically
the laboratory tests required under the program, which include a blood lead
level assessment appropriate to age and risk. In addition, other necessary
care (i.e., diagnosis, treatment) discovered by the screen should be covered.
The program assumes that all children are at risk and thus should be tested.
Lead screening must be provided according to a mandatory periodicity
schedule at 12 months, 24 months and between 32 and 72 months if the
child has not been previously screened. If the capillary specimen and the
venous blood sample confirm an elevated blood lead level, states must
follow CDC guidelines on patient management and treatment, which
include a follow-up blood test and investigations on the source of lead.
Two EPSDT monitoring requirements are imposed on states. First, they must
have information available showing that services were provided. Second,
they must file annual 416 reports, which break down EPSDT data by age
group and by categorically and medically needy group. The report must
include the number and the percentage of children receiving at least one
initial or periodic screening service (dental and lead should be specifically
listed when all screening services were provided) and the number of
children receiving dental assessments. States can include more than the
required elements. The program has an 80 percent participation goal for
EPSDT in general and for the number of visits required by age group. In
1997, the aggregate Medicaid dental performance across states was 21
percent of Medicaid-covered children receiving the required EPSDT dental
services. Similarly, the aggregate Medicaid lead performance across states
was low, with 19 percent of Medicaid-covered children ages 1-5 being
screened for elevated blood lead levels. In both cases, this performance
varied widely by state.
Four states fell into this category. All Medicaid requirements apply to the
Medicaid program (see above) but not the separate SCHIP program, which is
governed by the SCHIP statute and regulations. Generally speaking,
separate SCHIP programs have more flexibility to determine which benefits
they will cover and what program monitoring and enforcement they will
pursue. SCHIP requires states to provide an actuarially-equivalent benefit
package for basic services, which must include well-baby and well-child
care. Unlike Medicaid, dental care and lead screening services are not
specifically listed as components of well-baby and well-child care. There
are no requirements similar to Medicaid in SCHIP regarding monitoring and
enforcement, i.e. there is no requirement to have a quality improvement
plan with quality and access standards in place and to monitor and report
on the provision of well-baby and well-child care services. When a state

States with
Medicaid and
separate SCHIP
programs, with
SCHIP contract
separate from
Medicaid contract
(n=3)

has integrated its SCHIP contract with its Medicaid contract, it usually
means that the same agency is responsible for overseeing both programs.
Three states fell into this category. All Medicaid requirements apply to the
Medicaid program (see first column, left) and all SCHIP requirements apply
to the separate SCHIP program (see second column, left). When a state has
issued a SCHIP contract that is separate from its Medicaid contract, it usually
means that two different agencies are responsible for overseeing each
program, raising issues of coordination between the two programs.

Source: CMS, 2003, http://www.cms.gov; ADA, 2003, http://ww.ada.org; CDC, 2003,
http://www.cdc.org
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INTRODUCTION

“As you know, managed care dominates the provision of health services to low-income,
publicly-insured children. Both Medicaid and SCHIP managed care tend to be the
mirror image of the private market. Under Medicaid, coverage is unusually broad,
ranging from comprehensive preventive services to virtually all forms of treatments and
medical interventions for children with serious health problems, with no cost-sharing
involved. Under SCHIP, coverage is somewhat more limited and cost-sharing is allowed
within certain limits. However, there is a trade-off for the broad coverage and no (or in
the case of SCHIP, limited) cost-sharing in Medicaid and SCHIP managed care; this
trade-off is the MCO's extremely tight controls over access to care. For example,
publicly-sponsored managed care arrangements have no point-of-service option,
families must use the networks to which they are assigned, and care controls remain far
stricter, more closely resembling traditional, tightly structured HMO systems. Because
the contracts states negotiate on the behalf of children represent the sum total of the
health care that they will receive, the standards of pediatric care that are built into the
terms of the agreements themselves, as well as performance monitoring, contract
enforcement, and access to patient protections becomes of the utmost importance.
In this interview, we would like to understand your expectations regarding the intentions
that underlie two selected performance standards included in the Medicaid and SCHIP
managed care contracts. The first standard relates to a high prevalence childhood
condition—oral disease; the second standard relates to a low prevalence childhood
condition—mental retardation/developmental delay resulting from lead poisoning. In
this interview, we also would like to understand how these two standards are actually
monitored. We are particularly interested in the process of enforcement for both
Medicaid and SCHIP contracts, which involves not only the Medicaid and SCHIP
agencies but also other state agencies that may have jurisdiction over certain aspects of
contract enforcement. We would like to learn more about how you enforce the
contracts, and what barriers, if any, you face in doing so. We would also like to know
whether the language used in the contract has posed any problems from an
enforcement standpoint and, if so, what kinds of problems.
There are no right or wrong answers to our questions. You may choose to answer or
not answer any or all of them, but we believe that your informed experience will assist
many others as they develop accountability processes for managed care systems for
publicly-insured, low-income children All your answers are confidential. We will not
publish any information that could be attributable to you personally. The final report
will be sent to you when available.
Any additional comments are also welcome.”

A.

FORMAL PLAN WITH CLEAR GOALS, ASSIGNMENTS, MEASUREMENTS,
MILESTONES

1.

Does your agency have a formal, written monitoring and enforcement plan for
the provision of pediatric services spelled out in the Medicaid/SCHIP managed
care contracts, and if so, what are the main goals of the plan (e.g., to ensure
access to quality care)?

2.

What are your agency’s policy objectives regarding the monitoring and
enforcement of the pediatric oral health standards included in the contract?
2a.

3.

Similarly, what are your agency’s policy objectives regarding the monitoring and
enforcement of the pediatric blood lead level screening and detection and
MR/DD standards included in the contract?
3a.

4.

5.

6.

Are those objectives stated anywhere else besides the contract (e.g., policy
guidance, other policy document), and if so, how enforceable are they?

Are those objectives stated anywhere else besides the contract (e.g., policy
guidance, other policy document), and if so, how enforceable are they?

Your Medicaid/SCHIP managed care contract contains a number of pediatric oral
health standards required of MCOs, why did your agency set the oral health
standards this way?
4a.

Did your agency believe that the standards reflected existing industry
practices or an advance beyond current standards?

4b.

How were the standards arrived at and negotiated with contractors?

Similarly, why did you set the MR/DD and blood lead level screening and
detection standards the way you have in your Medicaid/SCHIP contract?
5a.

Did your agency believe that the standards reflected existing industry
practices or an advance beyond current standards?

5b.

How were the standards arrived at and negotiated with contractors?

Which agency(ies) is(are) responsible for implementing and enforcing the
policies regarding oral health, blood lead level screening and detection and
MR/DD?

7.
8.

Would you say that the personnel responsible for implementing and enforcing
the contract are committed to promoting the policy goals regarding oral health,
blood lead levels and MR/DD?
Do those implementing and enforcing the policy goals regarding oral health,
blood lead level screening and detection and MR/DD enjoy the support of
superiors?

9.

Would you describe policy beneficiaries—Medicaid/SCHIP recipients and
MCOs—as organized and as cohesively supporting implementation of the policy
regarding oral health, blood lead level screening and detection, and MR/DD?

B.

COORDINATION STRATEGIES

1.

Do the Medicaid/SCHIP agency and the various other agencies responsible for
enforcement (e.g., AG, DOI) administratively coordinate their efforts?

2.

Does the Medicaid/SCHIP agency evaluate the results of individual appeals filed
on behalf of children who have been denied medical care and, if so, how is this
information used?

3.

Are the results of internal audits of performance disseminated among companion
enforcement agencies?

4.

How do the various agencies involved in enforcement coordinate their data,
monitoring and investigations to ensure that MCOs that exhibit potentially
substandard performance in multiple areas are quickly detected and the
problems addressed?

5.

Do key staff from the various agencies and programs involved in enforcement
share information and communicate on a regular basis?

6.

Does the Medicaid/SCHIP agency track out-of-plan use of services and benefits
(e.g., furnished by the Title V special needs program) but that also are covered
under its managed care agreements, and if so, does it require MCOs, which have
received prepayments to provide these services, to reimburse the state?

C.

DETECTION STRATEGIES

1.

Has the Medicaid/SCHIP agency created a general mechanism for monitoring
compliance, and if so, what does it consist of?

2.

In general, how does the agency identify certain “early warning signs” that act as
an indicator of potential problems?

3.

Has your agency specified quantifiable standards for measuring compliance with
the pediatric oral health standards, and if so, what are they and how are they
measured?

4.

Similarly, has your agency specified quantifiable standards for measuring
compliance with the pediatric blood lead level screening and detection and
MR/DD standards, and if so, what are they and how are they measured?

D.

ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES

1.

Would you characterize your agency and state’s general approach to monitoring
and enforcement as proactive, systematic, ongoing or as reactive, periodic?

2.

Are analyses and investigations independently conducted by your agency and
the state, by an external organization, or by the plans, or a combination of those?

3.

Would you say that the penalties and incentives you have in place favor
compliance, and if so, what are they and how have you used them?

4.

What are some of the barriers your agency faces in enforcing the contracts, e.g.,
has the language used in the contract posed any problems from an enforcement
standpoint?

E.

REPORTING STRATEGIES

1.

Would you say that the Federal government is an active participant on behalf of
those protected by the existing policies regarding oral health, blood lead levels
and MR/DD? Why or why not?

2.
Does the state report back to CMS and OIG for additional sanctions beyond the
purview of the state? How often?

F.

REQUEST FOR REFERRALS

1.

Would you be willing to refer us to MCOs that would be willing to participate in
our study and to discuss how they internalize contract requirements?

2.

Would you be willing to refer us to colleagues in other agencies (e.g., AG, DOI)
who would be willing to talk to us about the process they follow to enforce
Medicaid/SCHIP contracts?

